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The thesis deals with the design of an intelligent sensor network for protecting 
premises from chemical, biological and intruder attacks. This thesis gives a logical 
level design along with the architectures at various levels of hierarchy. The use of 
object technology is proliferating in the development of software, and in order to 
build robust and maintainable complex systems, mastering object-oriented (O-O) 
analysis and design is essential. The main goal of this thesis is to report on the 
experience of applying object-oriented modeling, analysis and design methodology to 
a real-world complex system represented by an intelligent sensor network for a 
building. UML has been used to model the software and automation infrastructure, 
which handles the interactions among processing elements in a modern building.  
A set of system design requirements are developed that cover the hardware design of 
the nodes, the design of the sensor network, and the capabilities for remote data 
access and management. A formal model is proposed for the architecture, and the 
behavior diagrams explain the dynamic nature of the system. The static and dynamic 
diagrams together validate and verify the system. Agent UML is discussed to model 
evacuation of a room. This thesis discusses some extensions to UML for agent-based 
  
 
modeling where the agents follow a purely reactive and proactive approach.  In this 
work, agent-based architectures and behavior diagrams are proposed as a method to 
envision security in buildings. Extensions are provided to support a multi room 
scenario. Sensor fusion is used to provide a robust functionality and reducing the 
events of false alarms occurring in the system. Linear programming techniques are 
used to solve for the minimal point in the cost vs. performance trade off curve for the 
sensor network as well as for the access system proposed. The tradeoff explores the 
relation of variables and suggests an operating point satisfying all constraints and 
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Chapter 1: Problem Statement and an Introduction to UML 
1.1 Modeling an Intelligent Sensor Network for a building 
Intelligent sensor networks for buildings protect the building from intrusion and terror 
attacks. The intelligent sensor network will monitor the premises and protect it 
against any untoward incident. The solution proposed is modular with key areas 
identified as the premise itself, the central unit overseeing the system, the sensors and 
the network. A heterogeneous sensor network is envisioned that would sense and 
monitor the environment. Keeping a low fault rate this network would use wireless 
communications to detect any untoward incident. A time efficient access system is 
required to screen entry into the premise and work in conjunction with a hierarchical 
security system preventing ingress at any point without validation of credentials.  A 
tiered approach to the problem with in-built redundancy is desired. Also contingency 
plans in the event of an attack should be provided. The design should be scalable and 
take into account budget constraints.  
 
1.2 Scope and Objectives 
 
The solution is formulated at a level of abstraction and proposes architectures that can 
meet the requirements. This project was done for Battelle; who would be using their 
proprietary protocols and pre-decided sensors to constitute their systems. This thesis 






The thesis drafts a design for an intelligent sensor network that will serve to protect 
the premises from a chemical, biological or intruder attack. UML is used to draft out 
the design envisioned for this system. Starting with gathering user requirements using 
Use Cases (Chapter 2), the system goes on to establish requirements for the system 
(Chapter 3). These requirements have corresponding validation scenarios that provide 
a check-list to ensure all the requirements are met. Tests, simulations etc are also 
documented as a means of testing if the requirements are truly met. The class 
diagrams (Chapter 4) proposes various architectures for the components of the 
system. With the Interaction and Behavior diagrams the dynamic behavior of the 
system is put in place. Sensor fusion is explained in the next section as a collaborative 
means of consolidating information regarding a particular measurement. Agent UML 
is discussed to model behavior that can not be captured using UML, this primarily 
comprises of objects rejecting messages received and acting on their own will. This is 
used to model behavior of people when they are evacuating. The last chapter deals 
with two tradeoff studies. The first study provides a deployment strategy for sensors 
keeping in mind the cost, detection probability and fault rates. The other tradeoff 
study uses queuing models to minimize time taken to clear employees while 
considering cost and reliability. 
 
The thesis aims at laying down guidelines and recommendation for system 
architecture and behavior. The task is multi-disciplinary and involves liaison between 
different departments at a company to achieve a robust, effective solution to the 





UML diagrams have been used in the proposed solution and the thesis starts with an 
introduction to UML. 
1. 3 UML 
A Model is an abstract representation of a specification, a design or a system from a 
particular point of view. It is often represented visually by one or more diagrams. It 
aims at expressing the abstracts without going into the details. Modeling is an 
essential part of large software projects, and helpful to medium and even small 
projects as well. A model plays the analogous role in software development that 
blueprints and other plans (site maps, elevations, physical models) play in the 
building of a skyscraper. Using a model, those responsible for a software 
development project's success can assure themselves that business functionality is 
complete and correct, end-user needs are met, and program design supports 
requirements for scalability, robustness, security, extendibility, and other 
characteristics, before implementation in code renders changes difficult and 
expensive to make.  
 
A modeling language is a way of expressing the various models produced during the 
development process. A modeling language defines a collection of model elements. A 
modeling language is usually diagrammatic but could be text based. It has: 
 
Syntax- in diagram based modeling language, the rules that determine which 
diagrams are legal 





The UML is "a language for specifying, visualizing and constructing the artifacts of 
software systems . . ." [Booch97]. UML is not a methodology. Any method can be 
used to gather software artifacts that are represented in UML as long as the meaning 
of those artifacts comply with the definition in the used notation. 
 
UML is a graphical language for {Visualizing, specifying, constructing, 
documenting} the artifacts for a software intensive system. It has become the de-facto 
standard for object oriented software modeling. UML allows the modeling of 
different aspects of systems at different levels of abstraction. 
 
The OMG's Unified Modeling Language™ (UML™) helps you specify, visualize, 
and document models of software systems, including their structure and design, in a 
way that meets all of these requirements. [1] 
 





Any development process aims to produce an implemented system. This is a program 
or collection of programs which work in an appropriate environment to fulfill user 
needs. The design and the architecture embody the important decision about how the 
system is built, abstracting away from many details. There are different views to a 
system such as  
 
Ø logical view: Modeled to check if functional requirements are met 
Ø process view: to insure that non functional requirements such as performance 
and availability are met. 
Ø development view: issues such as team assignments and reuse are dealt with 
for better management of the project 
Ø physical view: running and execution 
 










Figure 2 Views Explained 
UML's twelve standard diagram types.  
 
UML defines twelve types of diagrams, divided into three categories:  
Four diagram types represent static application structure; five represent different 
aspects of dynamic behavior;and three represent ways you can organize and manage 
your application modules.  
 
Structural Diagrams include the Class Diagram, Object Diagram, Component 
Diagram, and Deployment Diagram.  These, static models describe the elements of 
the system and their relationship. 
 
Behavior Diagrams include the Use Case Diagram (used by some methodologies 




Diagram, and Statechart Diagram. Used to represent the dynamic model that 




Figure 3 UML Diagrams  
UML unites and formalizes the methods of many approaches to the object oriented 






Chapter 2: Capturing System Functionality 
 
2. 1 Introduction to Use Cases 
Use Case analysis is one of the first and primary means of gathering requirements in 
the behavioral methodology. Use Cases are a critical technique in developing an 
application. Use cases are a standard technique for gathering requirements in many 
modern software development methodologies. Within the UML Use Cases are used 
primarily to capture the high level user-functional requirements of a system. Neither 
can Use Cases be effectively used to capture non-functional requirements nor can 
they be used to capture "internal" functional requirements. Primarily because Use 
Cases are an informal and imprecise modeling technique. Secondly because the other 
use that is made of Use Cases is to define the fundamental structure of the 
application.  
2.1.1 Defining Use Cases  
The very first question to be answered then is why do we develop the Use Case model 
- what Use Cases are and also - very importantly - what they are not. 
The Use Case model is about describing “what” our system will do at a high-level 
and with a user focus for the purpose of scoping the project and giving the application 
some structure. The Use Cases are the unit of estimation and also the smallest unit of 
delivery. Each increment that is planned and delivered is described in terms of the 





Use Cases are not a functional decomposition model. Use Cases are not intended to 
capture all of the system requirements. Use Cases do not capture”how” the system 
will do anything - nor do they capture anything the actor does that does not involve 
the system. All of these things are better modeled using other modeling techniques 
that were developed for those purposes.  
Ø The Object Model to capture the static structure of the system and the 
composition of the classes.  
Ø Object Sequence Diagrams and State Transition Diagrams to capture the 
detailed dynamic behavior of the system - the how. 
Use Cases are not an inherently object-oriented modeling technique.  
Use cases in UML are defined in various but similar ways within the literature. [3] 
 
"A use case is a narrative document that describes the sequence of events of an actor 
(an external agent) using a system to complete a process."[Jacobson92]  
 
"They are stories or cases of using a system. Use cases are not exactly requirements 
or functional specifications, but they illustrate and imply requirements in the stories 
they tell."[Larman98] 
 
"...domain processes can be expressed in use cases – narrative descriptions of domain 





"A description of set of sequences of actions, including variants, that a system 
performs that yield an observable result of value to an actor."[Booch99] 
"You apply use cases to capture the intended behavior of the system you are 
developing, without having to specify how that behavior is implemented. Use cases 
provide a way for your developers to come to a common understanding with your 
system's end users and domain experts. In addition, use cases serve to help validate 
your architecture and to verify your system as it evolves during 
development."[Booch99]  
2.1.2 Types of Use Cases 
There are two types of use cases.  
Ø Essential Use Case [Constantine97] :and the other type, 
Ø Real Use Case [Larman98]. 
 These use case types are defined below: 
"Essential Use Cases . . . are expressed in an ideal form that remains relatively free of 
technology and implementation detail; design decisions are deferred and abstracted, 
especially those related to the user interface."[Larman98]  
“Real Use Case concretely describes the process in terms of its real current design, 
committed to specific input and output technologies, and so on. When a user interface 
is involved, they often show screen shots and discuss interaction with the 
widgets."[Larman98]  
Essential use cases are of primary importance early in a project’s analysis. Their 
purpose is to document the business process that the system must support without 




since they document how a specific set of user interfaces will support the business 
process documented in the essential use case.  
 
The benefits of this style of use for use cases are twofold: the business processes are 
well documented, and the system requirements are described in terms of the processes 
they support. This makes for a close mapping between business process and 
requirements. [7] 
2.1.3 What is the objective of use case analysis? 
In general terms, the purpose of use case analysis is to document the business process 
that is to be supported by the system under development. However, to effectively 
develop a component-based application for that process, use case analysis must have 
a much more specific purpose. Use cases must document the business process to be 
supported in such a way as to facilitate the identification of operations that support 
the business process. Use cases must achieve the following goals in order to be 
effective for this stated purpose. [4] [8] [9] 
1. Use cases must be an Effective Communication Tool  
2. Use cases must be scoped to a Specific Business Goal, which means they 
must identify Business Decisions and Actions.  
3. Use case steps must be identified as Automated or Manual  
 
Effective Communication Tool 
Use cases are a tool for customers to communicate the business requirements to 
software developers. For this to be an effective tool, the software analyst must be able 




business analysis by way of use cases and still not get the information necessary to 
build a good software solution; however, if the information does not communicate the 
requirements, or if the software developers find them impossible to use, then the use 
cases have been done improperly.  
 
Use cases are a tool for software developers to communicate how the system meets 
the customer’s business requirements. The use case documents the business process 
that the software solution is designed to support. Software developers must be able to 
map the specific features and functionality of the system to the use case. This 
mapping allows developers to relate requirements to system functions to prove that 
the system meets the requirements of the system. If the software solution cannot be 
effectively mapped to the use case, then the software solution does not meet the 
business requirements. 
 
Use cases prove their worth when several things happen upon completion of the 
software solution. First, the customer, upon seeing the use cases again, agrees that the 
use cases properly describe the business process to be supported. Second, the 
software developers can show exactly how the system explicitly supports that 
business process. Third, the customer agrees that the system supports the business 
process as expected. Last of all, when a really good job was performed on the use 
cases, the customer will state, "I would like to take these use cases and use them as 
our procedure manual. We never have had this process documented so well and it 





Business Goals, Decisions, and Actions 
The use case definition provided above mentions that a use case must accomplish a 
business goal. This concept is very important to use case development and is 
illustrated in the following quotes. 
"An important issue I've come across with use cases is the difference between what I 
call user goals and system interactions."[Fowler97] 
"Both styles of use cases have their applications. System interaction use cases are 
better for planning purposes; thinking about user goals is important so that you can 
consider alternative ways to satisfy the goals. If you rush too quickly toward system 
interaction, you will miss out on creative ways to satisfy user goals more effectively 
than you might by using the obvious first choice. In each use case it is a good idea to 
ask yourself, "why did we do that?" That question usually leads to a better 
understanding of the user goal."[Fowler97]  
 
The identification of the business goal provides the analyst with the invaluable insight 
of knowing why each of the steps is to be performed. This leads to a system that 
better supports the business because the analyst can offer alternative solutions and, as 
a result, creates a system that adds more business value.  
 
Once the goal of the use case has been defined, each of the steps, manual and 
automated, necessary to achieve that goal are documented. While a use case is 




system, it is too early in the process to distinguish between manual and automated 
steps. In addition, the documentation of manual steps forms a complete picture by 
which a user can understand exactly where the system supports the business process 
and where manual work is required. This documentation of manual steps makes the 
use case a more effective communication tool.  
 
The best way to perform use case development for a business application is to focus 
on identifying business decisions and business actions in the use case steps. All steps 
are documented, but it is important to understand how each one supports a business 
decision or business action that in turn helps accomplish the use case goal. This 
approach will help to weed out unnecessary steps and it will cause each of the steps to 
have a clear purpose.  
 
Identifying business goals, decisions, and actions is the second objective of use case 
development (the first is being an effective communication tool). Focusing on these 
items during use case development will greatly enhance the business value of the 
delivered system. Unfortunately, properly identifying the goals, decisions, and actions 
can present a challenge to analysts.  
 
Automated vs. Manual Steps  
Each use case step must be identified as automated or manual. The focus of each step 
is to make a business decision or execute a business action. Assigning responsibility 




actor (manual) directly impacts the system delivered to support the business process 
because the automated steps will result in system operations to make these decisions 
or execute these actions. 
The system operations will be named according to the decisions or actions for which 
they are responsible. Naming operations this way will aid the ability to trace 
requirements to the delivered system because the operation name will reflect its 
business purpose, which should map to a business requirement.  
 
Use cases are a very useful analysis tool. They can be used to define the business 
processes and the system requirements that are necessary to support that process, 
which leads to a natural mapping between the business processes and the 
requirements. 
 
There are different types of use cases that can be used in different situations. Certain 
use cases describe business processes and the system response at a high level 
(essential use cases). These use cases can be refined to describe the interaction that 
takes place in a particular implementation of a system (real use cases). 
The primary goal of use case analysis is to be an effective communication tool that 
describes the business processes and assigns responsibility to the steps of the process 







Use cases document the behavior of the system from a User’s point of view. 
Anything external to the system and that interacts with it qualifies as a user in this 
context.  Use case modeling helps with the following three important aspects: 
Ø Capturing requirements 
Ø Planning Iterations of development 
Ø Validating systems 
 
2.2 Hierarchical Use Cases 
Since the system analyzed is large scale a hierarchical approach to designing use 
cases has been adopted. Three primary areas have been identified for the system: 
 
Ø Access consisting of  
o intruder attack,  
o authorized access by employee, 
o visitor access 
o enrollment  
o and tailgating 
Ø Fault consisting of  
o Partial Failure,  
o Power failure, 
Ø Sensor consisting of  
o Sensing and monitoring  
o Add sensor, 





The figure below shows the system level Use case model. The use case depicts 3 
higher level use cases viz Access, Sensor and Fault. The chief actors are the threats in 
terms of intruders and threats which interact with the system, the staff including the 
employees, maintenance and operating staff and the security.  
 
 






2.2.1 Decomposition of higher level Use Cases 
Each Use Case in Figure 5 merits a Use Case model as it is a condensation of an 
aspect of the system under consideration. The system in itself comprises of the 
protected premise which has its own functions and components such as people, 
electrical system, plumbing system details of which will be dwelt on in Chapter 4. 
Anything external to the system which would include people, environment, would 
instigate a response on interaction with the systems of the protected premises. These 
reactions could be classified as  
1. Normal; comprising of routine activities such as- employee access arising 
from the fact that employees will enter and leave the building every day in 
what is classified as an authorized access; a temporary authorized access by a 
legitimate visitor, checking identification, sensing and monitoring by the 
sensors, diagnostics checks among others. 
2. Abnormal; these in a good system would arise relatively infrequently and 
comprise of alarms, threat detection, faults etc. 
Each of the higher level use cases comprise of sub use cases that are decomposed in 
the following sections. 
2.3 Use Case Access: Decomposed 
The next figure gives an insight into the level 1 Use case: Access. This use case 
captures all conceivable interactions between the access system of the building and an 
attempt to gain entry. It includes the interaction of intruders; an attempted authorized 





In either case whether the access is legitimate or illegitimate the use case VerifyID 
gets executed for every access attempted. The objective of the use case VerifyID is to 
allow authorized personnel to enter the protected premises while keeping the 
intruders out. The execution of this use case is an integral part of any attempt to gain 
entry and hence has the include relationship with the other use cases. 
 
The tailgating use case deals with the case when an authorized access is followed by 
an unauthorized entry before the door closes. Such a scenario can be prevented by a 
motion sensor which will detect two entries instead of the authorized one and signal 
security. The idea here is one entry for each attempted access. This use case can also 
be extended to install a check into the information system to see if a person logging 
into a computer in the company has passed the proper levels of authorization. This 
could include a check to see if the person has gained legitimate entry; if not then 
he/she would not be allowed to gain access to the system.  
 
The enrollment process consists of a record that has to be generated between the ID 
card number of the employee and the employee name and department. Some 
employees are authorized to gain access into the enrollment system. Once this has 
been done, the employee swipes his card. The number is captured and the name and 
department of the employee is thrown up, when the employee verifies his information 
a record is established in the user account and a random code is generated. The 





2.3.1 The Access Use Case: 
 
Figure 5 Access Use Case 
 
Figure 6 is a pictorial representation of the Access Use Case. Below is a 
documentation of the Use case. A standard template [13] has been used throughout to 









Use Case Name  Level1_access- Authorized Access 
Iteration    
Summary: 
All employees who need access to the system need to enter an 
identification number and swipe a card. If the combination matches 
with the one stored access is permitted. 
    
Basic Course of 
Events 1. Authorized personnel enters building 
  
2. Authorized personnel supplies information for identification 
procedure. Use VerifyID to return result.  
  3. Authorized person is verified 
  4. Authorized person is allowed access 
    
Alternative paths  N/A 
Exception path 1. If in step 2 Employee enters invalid ID code 
  2. Display error message, request id again 
  3. Return to step 2 
  
4. Allow procedure to repeat 3 times, then confiscate card and lock 
exits, alert security by alarm generation 
    
Extension Points 
 At point 1 determine if employee is a visitor switch to use case 
Temporary authorized access 
    
Trigger Employee requires access 
    
Assumptions All sensors are operating and there is no fault in the system 
    
Preconditions The system is operational 
    
Post conditions Validated user is allowed access 




    
Author Rajeshree Varangaonkar 
    
Date Sep-03 




Use Case Name  Level1_access- Temporary authorized Access 
Iteration    
Summary: 
All visitors who need access to the system need to confirm their 
identity with the security who verifies it with the employee being 
visited. Once the visitor has been verified he/she is assigned 
temporary identification. 
    
Basic Course of 
Events 1.  Visitor requests access at gate 
  2.  Credentials identified with authorized employee seeing the visitor. 
  3.  Assigned temporary information to pass the identification process 
  4.  Post condition 
  5.  Visitor admitted 
  
6.  On leaving visitor surrenders temporary information which is 
destroyed 
   
Alternative paths  N/A 
   
Exception path 1. If in step 2 visitor enters invalid ID code 
  2. Display error message, request id again 
  3. Return to step 2 
  
4. Allow procedure to repeat 3 times, then confiscate card and lock 
exits, alert security by alarm generation 
    
Extension Points N/A 
    
Trigger Visitor requires access 
    
Assumptions All sensors are operating and there is no fault in the system 
    
Preconditions The system is operational 
    
Post conditions Validated user is allowed access 
    
Related Business 
Rule N/A 
    
Author Rajeshree Varangaonkar 
    
Date Sep-03 






 Table 3 Unauthorized Access 
Use Case Name  Level1_access- Unauthorized Access 
Iteration    
Summary: An unauthorized person tries to gain access and must be apprehended 
    
Basic Course of 
Events 1. Unauthorized person enters premises 
  
2. Unauthorized person tries to gain access by supplying information. 
Check by using VerifyID 
  3. Information fails verification. 
  4. Lock exits 
  5. Alarm alert, use Alarm Generation to generate alarm 
  6. Security is alerted 
   
Alternative paths  
1. Detector has failed and no alarm sounds alerting of UAP 
2. When the UAP tries to enter any door inside the building the 
access system can be configured to detect if person has gained 
access through proper channel. 
3. If the person hasn't door will be locked and security alerted. 
 
   
Exception path N/A 
    
Extension Points N/A 
    
Trigger Unauthorized person tries to gain access 
    
Assumptions All sensors are operating and there is no fault in the system 
    
Preconditions The system is operational 
    
Post conditions Unauthorized person apprehended. 
    
Related Business 
Rule N/A 
    
Author Rajeshree Varangaonkar 






Use Case Name  Level1_access- Tailgating 
Iteration    
Summary: 
An unauthorized person tries to gain access by trying to get in 
through the door when an authorized employee enters. When the 
authorized employee has been verified and door has opened there 
will be a small lag before the door closes again during which the 
unauthorized person will try to slip in. 
    
Basic Course of 
Events 1. Authorized employee enters premises 
  
2. Authorized employee supplies information, is verified using 
VerifyID and enters premises 
  
3. When door opens Unauthorized employee tries to get in through 
the door too. 
  4. Detector on door detects two entries of people for one card swipe 
  5. Exits are locked and Alarm is sounded, using Alarm Generate 
  6. Security apprehends UAP 
   
Alternative paths  N/A 
   
Exception path N/A 
    
Extension Points N/A 
    
Trigger Intruder tries to tailgate 
    
Assumptions All sensors are operating and there is no fault in the system 
    
Preconditions The system is operational 
    
Post conditions Unauthorized person apprehended. 
    
Related Business 
Rule N/A 
    
Author Rajeshree Varangaonkar 
    
Date Sep-03 










Use Case Name  Level1_Access Enrollment 
Iteration    
Summary: Employees are enrolled into the database for verification of ID upon activation 
    
Basic Course of 
Events 
1. Authorized personnel swipes card and selects enrollment from the 
menu. 
  
2. Employee to be enrolled then inserts his card in the slot of the card 
reader and the number on card is captured. 
  
3. Employee's name and department recovered from existing 
database and displayed 
  4. Employee verifies information and presses "Enter" 
  
5. System generated a key in ID code to be used by employee when 
attempting access 
  
6.  Authorized personnel then swipes his own card again and exits 
the enrollment mode. 
    
Alternative paths  1. Employees record not found on card being swiped 
  2. Go back to step 1 and restart process 
  3. If error recurs notify administrator 
    
Exception path N/A 
    
Extension Points N/A 
    
Trigger Authorized personnel swipes card and selects enrollment from menu 
    
Assumptions System operating and there is no fault in the system 
    
Preconditions 
The system is operational, Employees that can carry enrollment have 
been authorized to do so 
    
Postconditions Employee is enrolled 




    
Author Rajeshree Varangaonkar 
    
Date Sep-03 
Table 5 Enrollment 
 
 




Iteration    
Summary: 
Alarm condition here would mean violation of limits or setting of a 
value. Usually the value at which an alarm is generated is set at + 
XX% of normal value for sensor measurement at the higher side and 
-XX% of normal value for sensor measurement at the lower side  
    
Basic Course of 
Events 
1. If (sensor measurement IS EQUAL TO alarm condition) then 
Sound alarm, end. 
  2. Security alerted 
  3. Attend reason 
  4. Reset alarm 
    
    
Alternative paths  Alarm fails, a backup circuit will kick in setting off the alarm  
    
Exception path N/A 
    
Extension Points N/A 
    
Trigger Sensor measurement reaches alarm condition 
    
Assumptions All sensors are operating and there is no fault in the system 
    
Preconditions The system is operational 
    
Post conditions Alarm condition rectified 
    
Related Business 
Rule N/A 
    
Author Rajeshree Varangaonkar 
    
Date Sep-03 














Use Case Name  Level1_access- VerifyID 
Iteration    
Summary: 
Anybody who tries to gain access has to enter an identification code 
and swipe his card, if a match is found the person has been 
authenticated. 
    
Basic Course of 
Events 1. Read identification code 
  2. Read Barcode on card 
  3. Compare combination with stored records 
  4. If match found return result TRUE 
  5. If match not found return result FALSE 
    
Alternative paths  N/A 
    
Exception path 
If any of the inputs not received in correct format/not received at all 
request information again 
    
Extension Points N/A 
    
Trigger Inputs received as identification code and bar code 
    
Assumptions System operating and there is no fault in the system 
    
Preconditions The system is operational 
    
Post conditions Inputs compared result ready 
    
Related Bus iness 
Rule N/A 
    
Author Rajeshree Varangaonkar 
    
Date Sep-03 
Table 7 Verify ID 
2.3.2 Fault Use Case 
Figure 7 is a pictorial representation of the fault use case. The fault use case includes 
all diagnostics aspects of the system model. The system has a normal mode of 
operation until it encounters a fault in its system. The sensor would be equipped with 




described as a drift in the measurement that would be detected on comparison with 
the reading of redundant sensor for e.g. a 3 way voting scheme can be used to detect 
an errant reading. This would basically include 3 redundant sensors whose 
measurements are compared among themselves as well as with a floating average and 
hence any errant measurement would be voted out. This is a good recourse as the 
errant reading is within error limits and an out voting eliminates the removal of a 
sensor and reducing the strength of the logic. It also allows the system availability to 
be unperturbed. In the faulty mode however logic determines a sensor malfunction by 
comparing the reading with a redundant sensor. Also here the fault threshold is the 
error limit along with a tolerance limit to account for the manufacturing difference 
between any two sensors. An alarm again will be generated and hence is included in 
the system. In the case a sensor malfunction is detected it is transmitted over the 
network allowing other sensors in the group to recognize that the sensor is faulty and 



























Use Case Name  Level1_fault- Faulty Mode 
Iteration    
Summary: 
Sensors have their own fault detection circuitry and a fault is 
discovered and indicated. Every sensor has a redundant 
circuit and a slave. In case of fault in Master control is 
switched to redundant circuit/slave 
    
Basic Course of 
Events 
1. Diagnostics detect fault in sensor and transfer control to 
redundant circuit/slave 
  2. The faulty mode light comes on. 
  3. Alarm is generated and maintenance staff alerted. 
  4. Sensor is attended to and then replaced 
  5. Sensor is switched back to master mode. 
    
Alternative paths  Alarm fails to generate. 
  
The measurement form the sensor can be compared with a 
redundant sensor and also a pre stored average. 
  
If (reading_redundantsensor IS EQUAL TO  (+/- 10%) 
average) 
  reading_redundantsensor=correct 
  
If (master_sensor IS NOT EQUAL TO (+/-10%) 
reading_redundantsensor) 
  master_sensor has developed an error 
  End 
  
* +/- is set as a tolerance limit to account for manufacturing 
difference between sensors 
    
    
Exception path N/A 
    
Extension Points N/A 
    
Trigger Fault signal received 
    
Assumptions System operating and there is no fault in the system 
    
Preconditions The system is operational 
    
Post conditions Fault attended and rectified 




Author Rajeshree Varangaonkar 
Date Sep-03 







Use Case Name  Level1_fault- Partially  Faulty Mode 
Iteration    
Summary: 
In the partially faulty mode no alarm is generated as the error is 
usually a drift that does not violate limits. In this case the reading is 
compared to two other sensors and voting takes place. 
    
Basic Course of 
Events Sensor generates errors within limits e.g. a drift or a bias 
  No fault alarm generated as no limits violated 
  
A redundancy scheme (for e.g. Triple redundancy scheme) for voting 
of errant measurement.  
  
Sensor measurement tagged as errant by diagnostics, fault should be 
attended to by maintenance 
    
    
Alternative paths  N/A 
    
Exception path N/A 
    
Extension Points N/A 
    
Trigger Errant behavior  
    
Assumptions System operating and there is no fault in the system 
    
Preconditions The system is operational 
    
Post conditions Fault attended and rectified 




    
Author Rajeshree Varangaonkar 
    
Date Sep-03 
Table 9 Partially Faulty Mode 
 
2.3.3 Sensor Use Case 
The Use cases highlight the interaction between the external actors and the system 




environment parameters. These parameters such as temperature, pressure, humidity 
etc interact with the sensing mechanism and produce a change in the sensor output. 
 
The Use Case model includes some standard normal functions like addition of 
sensors, deletion of sensor, sensing & monitoring and again communication. These 
methods deal with the inherent functioning of a sensor group and maintain protocol 
and group dynamics. Use case Threat detected is an abnormal event and enumerates 
the steps that need to be followed in the event of an untoward incident. Chapter 4 



























Use Case Name  
Level1_sensor- Threat detected 
Iteration    
Summary: 
A change in the air quality and measurements indicating the 
presence of a biological/chemical agent will indicate a threat 
to the system and evacuation, emergency measures are 
applied. 
    
Basic Course of 
Events 1. Sensors detect threat in environment (change in air quality) 
  2. Alarm is generated 
  3. suspected Ducts are closed; dampers and fans closed 
  4. Switch to alternate ducts on the other side of building 
  5. Isolate area 
  6. Pressurize remaining areas 
  7. Apply emergency measures for people 
  8. Compare outer contamination levels with inner 
  
9. If lower, evacuate; else let people stay in, continue 
monitoring end 
  10. Track movement of gas in area check spreading 
    
Alternative paths  1. Alternate ducts also set of alarms 
  2. Close ducts 
  3. Isolate suspected area 
  4. Pressurize uncontaminated area 
  5. Use emergency measures for people 
  6. Lead people to safer area 
  7. Compare outer contamination levels with inner 
  
8. If lower, evacuate else let people stay in, continue 
monitoring end 
    
Exception path N/A 
    
Extension Points N/A 
    
Trigger change in measurement 
    
Assumptions System operating and there is no fault in the system 
Preconditions The system is operational 




Author Rajeshree Varangaonkar 
Date Sep-03 
















Use Case Name  Level1_sensor- Sensing&Monitoring 
Iteration    
Summary: All parameters are measured. 
    
Basic Course of 
Events 1. Sensors are operating and sensing 
  2. All measurements are communicated to other sensors 
  3. All measurements are within normal limits 
    
Alternative paths  N/A 
    
Exception path N/A 
    
Extension Points N/A 
    
Trigger Change in measurement 
    
Assumptions System operating and there is no fault in the system 
    
Preconditions The system is operational 
    
Post conditions System is continuously monitored 




    
Author Rajeshree Varangaonkar 
    
Date Sep-03 








Use Case Name  Level1_sensor- Add Sensor 
Iteration    
Summary: Sensors are added dynamically to the group 
    
Basic Course of 
Events 1. New sensor gets added dynamically 
  2. Verification for sensor access 
  
3. All sensors update information stored for peers using AddSensor(), 
communicate 
   
Alternative paths  N/A 
    
Exception path N/A 
    
Extension Points N/A 
    
Trigger Sensor requests to be added 
    
Assumptions System operating and there is no fault in the system 
    
Preconditions The system is operational, Number of sensors is known 
    
Post conditions Group size changed 
    
Related Business 
Rule N/A 
    
Author Rajeshree Varangaonkar 
    
Date Sep-03 
















Use Case Name  Level1_sensor- Delete Sensor 
Iteration    
Summary: Sensors are deleted dynamically from the group 
    
Basic Course of 
Events 1. Sensor drops out dynamically 
  
2. All sensors update information stored for peers using 
DeleteSensor(), communicate 
   
Alternative paths  N/A 
    
Exception path N/A 
    
Extension Points N/A 
    
Trigger Sensor deleted 
    
Assumptions System operating and there is no fault in the system 
    
Preconditions The system is operational, Number of sensors is known 
    
Post conditions Group size changed 
    
Related Business 
Rule N/A 
    
Author Rajeshree Varangaonkar 
    
Date Sep-03 







Chapter 3: Requirements 
The requirements here are divided into two areas one is the sensor network and the 
other is the access system. The sensor network as mentioned earlier will have 
predefined sensors and protocols so the requirements developed are very general and 
independent of sensor chosen. The sensor requirements are just a framework that can 
be used while documenting requirements for the real system.  
 
The approach in defining the sensor requirements is slightly unorthodox in that it 
suggests class diagrams, and some algorithms such as “the lost station algorithm” to 
illustrate some of the requirements. There is no intention to convert these 
requirements to specifications. However a map between generic requirements for the 
system and their validation scenarios is given. So that each requirement is associated 
to a validation scenario allowing for easy cross-checking. 
 
The access system however is a smaller system and has been dealt with by defining 
more detailed requirements which are converted to specifications. These 
specifications have been drawn out by collecting market data from two biometric card 
companies. [14] [15]  
 
The requirements – validation scenarios follow the orthodox way in which higher 
level requirements are broken down into lower level requirements. A requirements 




3.1 Higher Level Requirements for the sensor network: 
Higher level requirements: 
Ø Speed of response – Expected speed of response is targeted around X ms. 
Ø Fault tolerance – The number of fault alarms should be low. An acceptable 
level is 0.1%. The alarms generated must correspond to untoward events. 
Ø Availability – System downtime must be kept to a minimum. An availability of 
95% is desired. 
Ø Tamper proof- system should be tamper proof and give an indication of 
tampering. 
Ø Cost – low cost. A budget has to be maintained in this implementation. The 
cost of the system should be lesser than 10000$. 
Ø Hierarchical order A hierarchical order should be ensured. This may be used as 
a conjunction between two systems to ensure a two tiered approach to security. 
Ø IS system must be protected – the Information system should be protected 
against unauthorized access.  
Ø Sensors must be equipped with diagnostics. All sensors must have inbuilt 
diagnostics that would indicate drift, error and faulty modes.  
Ø Remote control: Apart from local computing, remote control must also be 
enabled. 
Ø Monitoring software is that it should be highly scalable. It should be able to 
work for a small retail store, an office building, a warehouse or a multi-




Ø Sensor network longevity. Power consumption – Low power consumption and 
an estimated life of XX hours is desired.  
Ø From both a systems and end-user perspective, it is critical that sensor 
networks exhibit stable, predictable, and repeatable behavior whenever 
possible. An unpredictable system is difficult to debug and maintain.  
Ø Sensors and sampling: For our particular applications, the ability to sense light, 
temperature, infrared, relative humidity, and barometric pressure provide an 
essential set of useful measurements. The ability to sense additional 
phenomena, such as acceleration/vibration, weight, chemical vapors, gas 
concentrations, pH, and noise levels would augment them. 
Ø Data archiving: Archiving sensor readings for offline data mining and analysis 
is essential. The reliable offloading of sensor logs to databases in the wired, 
powered infrastructure is an essential capability. The desire to interactively 
“drill-down” and explore individual sensors, or a subset of sensors, in near 
real-time complement log-based studies. 
 
 
3.2 Breaking down requirements for sensors 
Breaking these down we concentrate on some for the sensors: 
• No source of interference to systems being monitored and/or surrounding 
systems. 
• Totally portable and self-sustained (power, communication, intelligence). 





• Minimize operating and maintenance costs. 
• Be a highly reliable system, assure data integrity and availability. 
• Capable of embedded complex data processing. 
• Capable to self-diagnose the communication links and automatically 
reconfigure upon failure detection 
Performance 
• Low RF output power (≤10 mW) to minimize any interferences to 
surrounding systems. 
• Battery-operated system with smart embedded power management algorithms 
to maximize battery life. 
• Self-contained system with signal conditioning, data acquisition, data 
manipulation and data transmission capability. 




• Sensor Network composed of one or more Central Stations and a number of 
remote stations. 
• Central Station: 
– Performs sensor network data collection, storage and distribution to 
users. 
– Contains data polling schedules and ID tables for the remote stations 




– Contains remote stations calibrations curves and engineering unit 
conversions 
– Perform data trending and historical archiving of sensor data and 
remote station health status information for each of remote stations. 
– Contains software algorithms to support a) automated data polling 
operation, b) customer requested data polling and c) troubleshooting 
capabilities.   
– Allows offline data mining. 
 
The class diagram in chapter 4 captures these requirements: 
 
* These characteristics can be embedded at the remote station level if desired. 
Software 
• Each module has its unique embedded software algorithms to control their 
assigned operation. 
• The Power Management module contains software algorithms to monitor 
battery health status and to maximize battery life.  The Power Management 
software controls the “ON/OFF” power cycles of the rest of the modules. 
• The Analog Interface module and Embedded knowledge module contain 
software algorithms specific to the application or sensor technology being 
monitored. 
• The RF Core module contains software algorithms to assure data 





The algorithm below and the activity diagram together provide an example of one of 
the algorithms that could be implemented in the system to meet the requirements of 
the system [17] 
 
Lost station 
Ø The Network starts in a nominal master/remote (point-to-point) protocol. 
Ø A communication failure is detected between the Central Station and a Remote 
Station. 
Ø The Central Station commands the remote stations to locate and communicate 
with the lost station 
Ø The assigned Remote Station establishes communication with the “Lost 
Station” on a secondary established frequency. 
Ø Information is relay back and forth between the Central Station and the “Lost 
Station” through the assigned Remote Station. 
Ø The Sensor Network automatically reconfigures from a traditional 






















Figure 9 Power Management 
3.2.2 Establishing validation scenarios 
To see if these requirements are met we design validation scenarios to confirm that 
the design meets the client needs. The design of these scenarios would be a top down 
approach and as the requirements are decomposed so would the validation scenarios. 
Intuitively we can conclude that these components of validation when taken bottom 
up should combine to form the top level scenario. Such a model would ensure that 
breaking down of the higher layers into the lower ones would ensure conformity to 
the architecture when combined the reverse way. 
  
Our premise lends to the formation of a trace between each requirement its 




lower level scenarios mapping to lateral layers in lower levels of the requirements 
structure. Such a tiered structure helps to establish a one to one mapping between the 
requirements and the validation scenarios. 
Requirement # 1: Speed of response – Expected speed of response is targeted to be 
the lowest 
Validation Scenario # 1:  This can be done using manufacturer’s data as well as a 
simulation can be carried out to attest if the requirement is indeed met. 
Simulation Simulation tests can be carried out to time the response of the system.  
Set up a sensor measuring phenomenon(e.g. temperature, pressure etc) 
Induce change in phenomenon value ( change in temperature) to pre-decided 
value 
Check time taken for sensor to register change in measurement. 
Record time 
Check time against requirement. 
Criteria for passing: Time <= requirement 
Criteria for failing:  Time exceeds requirement  
 
Requirement # 2: Fault tolerance – The number of fault alarms should be low. An 
acceptable level is 0.1%. The alarms generated must correspond to untoward events. 
Validation Scenario # 2: Chapter 8 of this thesis describes a trade off study that 
minimizes the false rate subject to constraints and arrives at a value of 0.0615% for 
the fault rate. 





Requirement # 3: Availability – System downtime must be kept to a minimum. An 
availability of 95% is desired. 
Validation # 3: Most manufacturers carry records of equipment, downtime, scheduled 
maintenance, availability based on historical data. While selecting components of the 
system; manufacturer data can be consulted to see if the requirement is met. 
Documentation: Manufacturer’s documents can be used to cross check the 
requirement  
 
Requirement # 4: Tamper proof- system should be tamper proof and an indication of 
evident tampering. 
Validation Scenario # 4: Manufacturer’s documents usually indicate stress tests 
carried out for tamper proof testing.  
Documentation: Manufacturer’s documents can be used to cross check the 
requirement  
 
Requirement # 5: Cost – low cost 
Validation Scenario # 5: Costs of individual components can be added together to 
verify that the overall cost is met. A sample cost analysis test for the card reader 
system is covered in Section 3.3.3. 






Requirement # 6 Hierarchical order 
Validation Scenario # 6: While designing the system a hierarchical order has to be 
included in the architecture. Such a hierarchy is introduced also by including 2-tiered 
security measures such as checking in the IS system if user has cleared proper 
security channels. 
Design: Design of the system must include hierarchy, for e.g. Figure 24 IS security 
 
Requirement # 7 IS system must be protected – the Information system should be 
protected against unauthorized access.  
Validation Scenario # 7 Sequence diagram 28 checks for this  
Simulation: A simulation can be carried out to attest if this requirement is met.  
 Deactivate the entry door access system 
 Employee enters user name and password 
 Message displayed “Access Denied” 
 Alarm generated. 
Criteria for passing: Message “Access Denied” displayed 
Criteria for failing: System allows user to log into the system 
 
Requirement # 8 Sensors must be equipped with diagnostics 
Validation Scenario # 8: Manufacturer’s documentation carries information regarding 





Documentation: Inspection of the manufacturer’s documentation to verify presence of 
diagnostics. 
Requirement # 9 Remote control 
Validation Scenario: The presence of a central system that communicates records 
activities validates this requirement. The system is shown in figure 8. 
This system is also found in class diagrams for the system overview. 
Design: Design must include the architecture of the central control system with 
remote abilities. 
Requirement # 10 Monitoring software should be highly scalable. It should be able to 
work for a small retail store, an office building, a warehouse or a multi-building 
complex. That goal has implications for the way that one designs the monitoring 
software. 
Requirement # 11 Sensor network longevity. Power consumption – Low power 
consumption and an estimated life of XX hours is desired. Sensor networks that run 
for 9 months from non-rechargeable power sources would have significant audiences 
today.  
Validation Scenario: Manufacturer’s data provides information about the power 
consumption, batteries, battery life. Also the power management software designed 
for the sensor will control the modes of the power consumption. 
Simulation: To check the power management software a simulation should be carried 




Documentation:  The documentation provided by the manufacturer should be 
checked. 
Requirement # 12 From both a systems and end-user perspective, it is critical that 
sensor networks exhibit stable, predictable, and repeatable behavior whenever 
possible. An unpredictable system is difficult to debug and maintain.  
Validation Scenario #12 A check of the fault rate is required which can be checked 
through the trade off studies. The characteristics of the sensor can be obtained from 
the manufacturer. 
Documentation:  A check of the manufacturer documents should be done for this 
requirement. 
Requirement # 13: Sensors and sampling: For our particular applications, the ability 
to sense light, temperature, infrared, relative humidity, and barometric pressure 
provide an essential set of useful measurements. The ability to sense additional 
phenomena, such as acceleration/vibration, weight, chemical vapors, gas 
concentrations, pH, and noise levels would augment them. 
Validation Scenario # 13: Sensors picked for the application should be crosschecked 
with the list. 
Documentation: See all necessary sensors are included 
Requirement # 14: Data archiving: Archiving sensor readings for offline data mining 
and analysis is essential. The reliable offloading of sensor logs to databases in the 
wired, powered infrastructure is an essential capability. The desire to interactively 




complement log-based studies. In this mode of operation, the timely delivery of fresh 
sensor data is key. 
Validation Scenario# 14: A Data log system should be included in the system 
architecture. 
Inspection: Presence of an offline system will indicate completion of the requirement. 
3.2.3Validation Scenarios for lower level requirements: 
 
• No source of interference to systems being monitored and/or surrounding 
systems. 
• Be a highly reliable system, assure data integrity and availability 
• Low RF output power (≤10 mW) to minimize any interferences to 
surrounding systems. 
These three requirements are explained by the following scenario: 
Validation Scenario: This is a field test, but at the same time the range of 
transmission can be verified and appropriate measures taken.  
For e.g. a sensor reports if it is in the range of a phenomenon. Assume there are N 
sensors out of which M are in the interference range with each other( the 
transmission range is greater than equal to the sensing range). Of the M sensors 
each Si will transmit data with bit rate b(Si). The total data in transit from time T 
to T+?where ? is the average latency can be expressed as  
           M 
Data=? b(S i) 
          i=1 
 
 If this value reaches a certain fraction of the channel capacity congestion will 




           M 
Data=? b(S i) =a Ctotal 
          i=1 
 
where a is the fraction of the capacity dictated by the self interference.  
Thus the upper bound on the reporting rate is dictated by channel capacity. On the 
other hand application specific criteria such as the required accuracy places a 
lower bound on the reporting rate. The reporting rate should be high enough to 
satisfy accuracy. At any point in time the number of active sensors should be such 
that the application specified requirements are met. If in order to meet accuracy 
requirement Capplication is the required channel capacity then  
           M 
Capplication = ? b(Si) = a Ctotal 
          i=1 
       
 i.e. Capplication = a Ctotal  to support application requirements.  
 
Not all sensors have the same accuracy. Accuracy is a function of both location 
and quality of information. 
Using this analysis and the range of the sensor given by the manufacturer a 
deployment strategy can be proposed.  
Chapter 8 describes a trade off study in which the deployment strategy is varied to 
get maximum detection while maintaining inter sensor distances and the fault rate 
minimum. 
 
• Totally portable and self-sustained (power, communication, intelligence). 
• Capable of embedded complex data processing. 
Validation: Manufacturer’s documentation will give specification regarding the size, 
portability and microprocessor used. 





• Capable to survive harsh environments (heat, humidity, corrosion, etc). 
Validation: Manufacturer’s documentation will give specification regarding tests 
conducted to check the strength of the system. Specifications regarding temperature 
range, humidity sustainable and corrosion proof etc will be supplied. While selecting 
sensors compare specifications with desired requirement. 
Documentation: Inspection of documentation to see if criteria is met. 
 
• Capable to self-diagnose and automatically reconfigure upon failure detection 
Validation: Manufacturer’s documentation will give specification. Also a simulation 
can be carried out to check for requirement conformance. 
 
• Battery-operated system with smart embedded power management algorithms 
to maximize battery life. 
Validation: Manufacturer’s specifications are a good starting point. Stress test to see 
if power is maintained at desired level. Assuming the manufacturers allow one sensor 
as a sample test piece the following test can e conducted. 
Tests:  
1. Initially keep sensor “ON” to check for drainage, power fluctuations 
and performance. Record observations and time to battery drainage. 
2. Leave Sensor on “Auto” mode where the internal power management 
will take over and manage the modes. Observe performance in each 
mode and record battery drainage. 




4. Check to see if power management software is configurable 
5. Repeat step 1 with your own algorithm 
6. Repeat steps from 1 through 5 for sensors from multiple 
manufacturers, compare outputs 
7. Select best sensor conforming to power requirements 
 
• Self-contained system with signal conditioning, data acquisition, data 
manipulation and data transmission capability. 
Validation: Manufacturer’s specifications are a good starting point. Check to see if 
specifications conform to desired requirements. 
 
• Modular flexible architecture reconfigurable to accommodate to most sensing 
technologies. 
Validation: This refers to the design of the system which is also covered in 
chapter 4 
 
• Sensor Network composed of one or more Central Stations and a number of 
remote stations. 
Validation: This refers to the design of the system which is also covered in 
chapter 4 
 
• Central Station: 





– Contains data polling schedules and ID tables for the remote stations 
in sensor network. 
– Contains remote stations calibrations curves and engineering unit 
conversions 
– Perform data trending and historical archiving of sensor data and 
remote station health status information for each of remote stations. 
– Contains software algorithms to support a) automated data polling 
operation, b) customer requested data polling and c) troubleshooting 
capabilities.  Allows offline data mining. 
 
Validation: Most manufacturers supply central systems with these capabilities, 
however also supplied is a configurable unit which can be programmed by the 
user to include custom functions. Check for the presence of such a unit. This also 
refers to the design of the system which is covered in chapter 4 
 
3.3 Higher level Requirements for the system of access control: 
1. System should prevent unauthorized access into the premises of the building 
2. System should allow visitors inside. Should maintain a record of visitors for future 
use 
3. System should use a biometric to confirm identity of person along with access code 
and identity cards. 
4. System should be tamper proof and should give a visual indication along with an 




5. System should be environment resistant 
6. System should be easy to maintain and install 
7. System should be able to communicate with the Network Management and control 
system 
8. System should have enough capacity to store biometrics locally without increasing 
storage burden on the central computer. 
9. System should prompt user to provide information and display error messages to 
user when wrong data is entered. 
10. System should be highly accurate and reliable. 
11. System should track an employee inside the building 
 
These requirements are ambiguous and are not properly quantified. This is typically 
the case at the beginning of design and these requirements are typically expressed 
with words like should, may etc. So the requirements are basically expressed in 
English without any proper quantification. We break down these requirements to 
arrive at requirements mapping to the system, subcomponent and component levels. 
This is a top down approach. These lower level requirements should trace up to one 
or more higher level requirements. If it doesn’t then it probably is not required. If a 
higher level requirement doesn’t break down to a lower level requirement the 
requirement is not being satisfied by the system design being considered. Similarly 
every requirement should trace to a component in the system. 
 
3.3.1 Requirement Synthesis: 




2 Every Employee will be equipped with an identification card to gain access in the building 
3 The card size shall be 2 1/8'' by 3 3/8'' (standard credit card size). 
4 The identification card will be equipped with an identification number that will indicate that the card belongs to the company.  
5 
It shall be impossible to change or erase the information contained in the card by exposing 
the card to an electro-magnetic field of any kind, or physically alter the code without 
destroying the card. 
6 The employee will start the access process by swiping the card in the reader 
7 The reader will be wall mounted and of dimensions 7 X 4 X 3 and weigh < 5 pounds 
8 
It should be possible to program the reader. Programming shall be accomplished by means 
of an integrated 12 key keypad and 16-character LCD display. Employee will key in the 
access code with the help of the keyboard on the reader. 
9 
 
The Card Reader/Memory unit shall be immune to weather, moisture and any 
environmental hazards. It should typically withstand extreme temperature conditions and 
moisture levels. 
10 Process of Enrollment (Defined as capturing biometric and information of a new user) should take < 40 seconds 
11 It shall be housed in a structure of high impact material for complete protection against weather or tampering. 
12 It shall be possible to place the associated electronics in a protected location preventing exposure of sensitive components to the elements and preventing tampering or vandalism. 
13 During a power failure, the memory unit shall maintain its memory content for a minimum of 72 hours. Restart after power restoration shall be automatic. Reliability should be > 0.95 
14 Card will be equipped with a biometric template to indicate person belongs to company.  
15 
The card will have to be put in a card reader. The card reader will identify the card 
identification number by comparing with an inbuilt database. 
16 The reader database should have a capacity to store at least 800 biometric templates and should have an expandable memory 




18 The reader will be equipped with the Door Controls, Tamper Switch and should be able to Lock exits.  
19 System will prevent tailgating or piggybacking.  
20 
The card reader with an integrated scanner will capture a biometric from the person and 
compare it with the existing template on the card and in the database. 
21 An alarm will be generated alerting security and the exit near the access area is blocked if unauthorized the person fails the identification. 
22 
The system must be cost effective. Budget for employee identification is restricted to 5000 
$ 
23 
When inside the building a person will be tracked with the aid of his identification tag 
when he gains access at any door.  
Table 14 Requirement synthesis for Access System 
3.3.2 System Test, Verification and Validation  
The importance of manufacturing and issuing reliable card products is vital to 
maintaining a good client relationship. In days past, card quality was overlooked as a 
minor issue; after all, it was only a low value plastic token that was easily replaced. 
Today, with increasing card usage and reliance, and the added expense of smart card 
(chip card) productions, there is no room for complacency. The image and 
performance of your card is a direct representation of your organization. The system 
developed should be tested before handing it over to the customer. Essentially it 
would require that all the requirements are adhered to.  
A system test can have a bottom up approach; starting at the unit level (a unit is the 
smallest whole of a system which cannot be divided further), going up to the module 
(a module is an aggregation of units), integration testing- the process of bringing 




the system test that comprises of a top down approach to integrating all system 
components. 
System requirements are used to test the system. By developing a test scenario for 





Test Accountability Simulation Examination 
1   X     
2       X 
3       X 
4 X       
5       X 
6       X 
7 X       
8     X X 
9         
10       X 
11 X       
12 X       
13     X X 
14 X       
15     X X 
16         
17     X X 
18     X   
19     X   
20 X       
21   X     























DOCUMENTS AT THE END OF TEST 




3.3.3 Validation Scenarios 
  
1. Every employee will be equipped with an identification card to gain access to the 
building.  
Accountability 1.1: Verify the number of employees with cards available 
                                 Check employee name with name on card to verify allocation 
Criteria to pass: every employee must have and only one card allocated to him/her. 
Failure: Any discrepancy in allocation will result in failure. 
Tools: List of names of employees 
Personnel required to do the task 
Documents at end of test:  A validated list of all card numbers and employee names 
associated with the card  
  
2. The card size shall be 2 1/8'' by 3 3/8'' (standard credit card size).  





Criteria to passing: Requirement +/-0.001% tolerance 
Failure: Any discrepancy will result in failure. 
Documents required: Specification provided by manufacturer 
Tools: A scale to measure length, breadth of card. 
Software required: Database containing employee and card information. 
Personnel required to conduct test 
 
3. It shall be impossible to change or erase the information contained in the card by 
exposing the card to an electro-magnetic field of any kind, or physically alter the 
code without destroying the card.  
Examination 3.1 Check for compliance with standards 
Failure: Non-Conformance 
 
4. The employee will start the access process by swiping the card in the reader  
4.1 Test Steps:  
Setup card reader:  
Use power supply as indicated in specification 
Power up card reader. Record time to start up (normal startup) 
Go through instruction manual and follow setup procedure 
On completing setup swipe card 
Reader displays message: "Enter identification Number" 





Thickness of card doesn't match thickness of reader slot. Check specifications. 
Document thickness of card and report to manufacturer. 
Card not recognized by reader 
Reader does not display any information.  
Setup doesn't complete properly. 
Tools: Card, Reader 
Document: Incident Report, Setup Manual, contact manufacturer. 
 
5 The reader will be wall mounted and of dimensions 7 X 4 X 3 and weigh < 5 pounds  
Examination 5.1: 
Weigh the reader.  
Criteria for passing: Weight < 5 pounds 
Failure: Weight does not match requirement. Document error and report to 
manufacturer 
Documents needed:  Specifications 
Tools: Weighing scale 
Examination 5.2: 
Measure dimensions 
Criteria for passing: Dimensions=7x4x3(+/-10% tolerance) 






6. It should be possible to program the reader. Programming shall be accomplished 
by means of an integrated 12 key keypad and 16-character LCD display.  
Examination 6.1The reader should be ISO compliant. 
Employee will key in the access code with the help of the keyboard on the reader.  
 
7 The identification card will be equipped with an identification number that will 
indicate that the card belongs to the company.  
Test7.1:  
Check if card identification follows ANSI/ISO/IEC 7812 standard. [19] Also see 
Appendix. 
Test 7.2 
Key in the number in the database 
Criteria for passing: A match with the name of the person on the card and employee 
name in database. 
Test Failure: Print out the employee names and corresponding identification number 
                    Case1: Employee name without number: Failure of Test 1 
                                Enter card number against employee number 
                                Store entry 
                                Run search for number again 
                                Result should indicate match between employee name and 
identification number 




                                    Case a: Redundant entry for an employee: Failure of Test 1, 
Failure of test 2 
                                    Check code for "Employee" Table in Database. If error-
Redefine constraints. 
                                    Document changes. 
                                    Case b: No Redundant entry found 
                                    Check number of cards against number of employees 
                                    Document discrepancy. 
Tools needed: Reader, card  
Document: Standards, Incident report, Setup Manual 
 
8. The Card Reader/Memory unit shall be immune to weather, moisture and any 
environmental hazards. It should typically withstand extreme temperature conditions 
and moisture levels.  
Examination 8.1 
Check standards for card testing  
e.g.  According to the DIN ISO 7810 "Identification cards" standard, a minimum 
bond strength of 6N/cm is required during the T-peel test. The test data of cards 
conforming to this standard would be made available by the manufacturer. 
Failure to conform will lead to the failure of this test. 





9. Process of Enrollment (Defined as capturing biometric and information of a new 
user) should take < 40 seconds 
Simulation 9.1:  
Installation personnel swipes card through the slot in the reader. 
Wait for prompt “Enter Code" 
Enter code using key board. 
Reader should display "Select Program" 
Program selected" Enrollment" 
Swipe employee card through reader 
Simultaneously start a stopwatch 
Reader should display "Hold finger close to scanner" 
The employee should hold his/her finger near the scanner 
Reader should display message "Scanning complete- Press any key to exit" 
Stop the stop watch 
Record time  
Criteria for passing:  time recorded< 40 seconds 
Failure  
If time > 40 seconds error generated inform manufacturer.  
Reader does not display correct message at Step 2, 4, 5 or 8 
 
 
Result Step 2 step 4 Step 5 Step 8 
Fail 0 0 0 1 
Fail 0 0 1 0 
Fail 0 0 1 1 
Fail 0 1 0 0 




Fail 0 1 1 0 
Fail 0 1 1 1 
Fail 1 0 0 0 
Fail 1 0 0 1 
Fail 1 0 1 0 
Fail 1 0 1 1 
Fail 1 1 0 0 
Fail 1 1 0 1 
Fail 1 1 1 1 
Table 17 Result Table 
Tools: Card, Reader 
Documents: Incident Report, Setup Manual 
 
10 It shall be housed in a structure of high impact material for complete protection 
against weather or tampering. & It shall be possible to place the associated 
electronics in a protected location preventing exposure of sensitive components to the 
elements and preventing tampering or vandalism.  
10.1 Examination: Check assembly specifications 
Refer Standards 
10.2 Test: Test assembly with procedure described in Standards. 
Failure: Failure to conform to standards 
Document: Incident Report, Specifications, Standards 
  
11 During a power failure, the memory unit shall maintain its memory content for a 
minimum of 72 hours. Restart after power restoration shall be automatic.  
Test 11.1: Step1 
After reader has been set up, extract a set of ID codes from the list. Use these to test if 




Remove power supply, start watch simultaneously 
monitor unit for 72 hours. 
At an interval of every hour check memory contents by entering set of numbers for 
identification. 
Also start an access process and an enrollment process 
Record output for all commands entered. 
Note any discrepancy. 
Check for display properties 
Criteria to pass test: All the outputs are same. 
Failure to deliver same output in all runs indicates a fault. Unclear numbers and an 
inability to read display messages. Error messages generated by the system. System 
crashes mid way through cycle test time. Wrong display messages. Check for stored 
data after an enrollment process by initiating an access process. 
Test 11.2:  
Repeat above procedure 
In the last one hour restore power supply 
Record any discrepancies 
Test the system again for enrollment and access procedures, key in the 
identification numbers to check output 
Record any discrepancies 
Remove power supply again 
Midway through the second run i.e. in the 36th hour restore supply. 




After another hour of operation remove supply again 
Wait for an hour and repeat steps 3 through 5. 
Criteria to pass: step 1 successful and All the outputs are same. 
Failure to deliver same output in all runs indicates a fault. Unclear numbers and an 
inability to read display messages. Error messages generated by the system. System 
crashes mid way through cycle test time. Wrong display messages. Check for stored 
data after an enrollment process by initiating an access process. 
 
12 Reliability should be > 0.95  
Test 12.1: Check for Reliability data from manufacturer 
        Check for MTBF, MTTR 
Failure: Reliability< 0.95 
Documents: Specification 
 
13 Card will be equipped with a biometric template to indicate person belongs to 
company.  
Examination13.1:   
Biometric strip is located on the card. 
Refer to standards by International Biometric group to ascertain the Dimensions of 
template 
Simulation 13.2 
Capture Biometric of employee on template through Enrollment process 
Swipe card 




Enter access code using keyboard 
Reader displays message: "Hold Finger near scanner" 
Hold your finger in front of the scanner 
Reader displays message: “Enter" 
Criteria for passing: Examination 13.1 & Simulation 13.2 both are passed. 
Failure:  
Reader doesn't recognize template 
Examination test fails. 
 
14 The card reader will identify the card identification number by comparing with an 
inbuilt database. 
Test 14.1:  
Swipe card A through the reader 
Swipe another card (any card that has not been configured)  
Criteria for passing:  
The reader should display message "Enter code" in case of card A 
 The reader should display "Invalid Card" for card B 
Failure:  
Result Card A Card b 
Fail 0 1 
Fail 1 0 
Fail 1 1 
Table 18 Result Table 
  
15 The reader database should have a capacity to store at least 800 biometric 





Check specifications given by manufacturer  
Check for memory configuration 
Criteria for passing: Memory capacity=> 800 and should be expandable 
Failure: Capacity<800 and memory is not expandable 
Documents: Incident Report, Specifications 
 




Reader displays message: “enter code" 
Enter access code using keyboard 
Reader displays message: "Hold Finger near scanner" 
Hold your finger in front of the scanner 
Reader displays message: “Enter" 
Stop stopwatch 
Record time 
Criteria of passing: Time recorded < 25 secs 
Failure:  
Time recorded> 25 seconds 
Reader does not display “enter code" message at Step 3 




Reader does not display "Enter" message at Step 7 
Key 0 indicates wrong message; 1 indicates right message 
 
 
Result Step 3 step 5 Step 7 
Fail 0 0 1 
Fail 0 1 0 
Fail 0 1 1 
Fail 1 0 0 
Fail 1 1 0 
Fail 1 0 1 
Fail 1 1 1 
Table 19 Matrix 
17 The reader will be equipped with the Door Controls, Tamper Switch and should be 
able to Lock exits.  
Examination17.1  
 Specification check 
Criteria for passing: Conformance to requirement 
Failure: Fail to conform to requirement 
 
18 System will prevent tailgating or piggybacking. 
Simulation18.1: 
Swipe card 
Reader displays message: “enter code" 
Enter access code using keyboard 
Reader displays message: "Hold Finger near scanner" 
Hold your finger in front of the scanner 




Door lock opens, enter through door 
Second person follows immediately before door closes 
Alarm sounds; all exits closed 
Criteria for passing: Alarm sounds 
Failure: Test fails if alarm doesn't sound indicating that the detector doesn't record 
second movement. Document error report to manufacturer 
 
19 The card reader with an integrated scanner will capture a biometric from the 
person and compare it with the existing template on the card and in the database.  
Simulation 19.1: Step 1 
Swipe card 
Reader displays message: “enter code" 
Enter access code using keyboard 
Reader displays message: "Hold Finger near scanner" 
Hold your finger in front of the scanner 
Reader displays message: “Enter" 
Door lock opens, enter through door. 
Criteria for passing: Reader successfully displays message 6 for the right biometric 
Simulation 19.2:  
Swipe any card different from the person bearing it. 
Reader displays message: “enter code" 
Enter access code for the card using keyboard 




Hold your finger in front of the scanner 
Reader displays message: “Type Mismatch" 
Door locks do not open. 
Criteria for passing: Simulation 1 successful and Simulation 2: reader displays “Type 
Mismatch" in step 6   
 
Result Card A Card b 
Fail displays "Enter" does not display "Type 
Mismatch"/random error 
Fail displays "Type Mismatch" Displays "Type Mismatch" 
Fail displays " Type Mismatch" Displays "Enter" 
Fail displays " Enter" Displays "Enter" 
Table 20 Result 
 
20 An alarm will be generated alerting security and the exit near the access area is 
blocked if unauthorized the person fails the identification.  
Simulation 20.1: 
Swipe card 
Reader displays message: “enter code" 
Enter incorrect access code using keyboard. Set Count=1 
Reader displays message: "Invalid entry try again" 
Enter incorrect access code using keyboard. Set Count=2 
Reader displays message: "Invalid entry try again" 
Enter incorrect access code using keyboard. Set Count=3 





All exits should be locked 
Criteria for passing: Reader displays correct message at step 3, 5 and 8 
Failure: 
Test fails if  
  
Result Step 4 step 6 Step 8 
Fail 0 0 1 
Fail 0 1 0 
Fail 0 1 1 
Fail 1 0 0 
Fail 1 1 0 
Fail 1 0 1 
Fail 1 1 1 
Table 21 test 
Key: 0 indicates wrong message i.e. 
step 4 Reader displays message “Enter" 
step 6 Reader displays message “Enter" 
step 8 Reader displays message “Enter"; 1 indicates right message as indicated in 
steps 
2. Alarm fails to sound 
3. Any or all of the exit fails to lock 
  
21 The system must be cost effective. Budget for employee identification is restricted 
to $500,000.  
Accountability 21.1:The cost of the system is not the capital expenditure you put 
upfront but the cost that will be incurred over the entire lifetime of the system and 
these include licensing costs, maintenance etc. So to meet the cost constraint all these 
















Chapter 4: System Architecture and Access Graphs 
4.1 Introduction 
Class diagrams represent the static structure of the classes and their relationships 
(e.g., inheritance, aggregation) in a system.  It does not indicate how they interact to 
achieve particular behavior. Every piece of behavior which is required of the system 
must be provided by objects of the classes. A good class model consists of classes 
which represent enduring classes of domain objects which don’t depend on a 
particular functionality required today.  
 
4.2 System architecture 
The Figure below is an abstraction of the system structure and gives the various 
components comprising it. Each class/component is dealt with individually in the 
following sections. 
 
We now describe the system architecture using Figure 10, functionality of individual 
components and how they operate together. Included in the Figure is the HVAC class 
which models the air supply of the building. This is important as we need to prevent 
the building from a chemical or biological attack and the HVAC system is the first 
weak link in the architecture against any such attack. Any agents introduced through 
this system will be circulated throughout the buildings. 
 
The IS system is the information system of the building, connecting the computers, 




has a built-in protection of security levels. An unauthorized access in the system will 
be detected either at the card reader level or it will be detected at the IS system. 
 
 
Figure 11 system structure 
 
In the following sections we explain how the architecture addresses the requirements 
set forth in Chapter 3. We developed a tiered architecture. The lowest level consists 
of the sensor nodes that perform general purpose computing and networking in 
addition to application-specific sensing. The sensor nodes may be deployed in dense 
patches that are widely separated. The central station connects to a database as well as 
an offline logging system. At the central station, the data is displayed to employees 






Figure 12 Central system 
 
The lowest level of the sensing application is provided by autonomous sensor nodes. 
These small, battery-powered devices are placed in areas of interest. Each sensor 
node collects environmental data primarily about its immediate surroundings. 
Because it is placed close to the phenomenon of interest, the sensors can often be 
built using small and inexpensive individual sensors. High spatial resolution can be 
achieved through dense deployment of sensor nodes. Compared with traditional 
approaches, which use a few high quality sensors with sophisticated signal 
processing, this architecture providing collaboration with other sensors measuring 






A computational module in the sensor is a programmable unit (Refer section 4.2) that 
provides computation, storage, and bidirectional communication with other nodes in 
the system. The computational module performs basic signal processing (e.g., simple 
translations based on calibration data or threshold filters), and dispatches the data 
according to the application’s needs. Compared with traditional data logging systems, 
networked sensors offer two major advantages: they can be retasked in the field and 
they can easily communicate with the rest of the system. 
 
Ultimately, data from each sensor needs to be propagated to the central station. The 
propagated data may be raw, filtered, or processed data. Bringing direct wide area 
connectivity to each sensor path is not feasible – the equipment is too costly, it 
requires too much power and the installation of all required equipment is quite 
intrusive to the environment. The base station may communicate with the sensor 
patch using a wireless local area network.  
 
The components must be reliable, enclosed in environmentally protected housing, and 
provided with adequate power, as per Requirement # 4. 
 
The architecture needs to address the possibility of disconnection at every level (also 
refer “lost station: activity diagram). Each layer (sensor nodes, clusters, central 
stations) has some persistent storage which protects against data loss in case of power 
outage. Each layer also provides data management services. At the sensor level, these 
will be quite primitive, taking the form of A/D conversions, amplification, signal 





Remote control of the network as per Requirement # 2 is also provided through the 
central system. Typically useful when it is required for the autonomous sensors to be 
controlled through a single point.  More of sensors are dealt with in the section Sensor 
class. 
 
The next section examines the remote station (sensor node) architecture. 
4.2 Remote Architecture explored 
4.2.1 Remote station architecture: 
Based on the requirements listed in chapter 3 and section 4.1 we propose an 
architecture for the remote station. In this section we consider the requirements for 
the remote stations [17] 
 
• Design should be modular in nature.  
• Number and types of modules will depend on specific application. 
• Basic configuration starts with a RF Core Module:  
– RF Core Module contains a RF Transceiver and a dedicated micro-
controller. 
– Connector interfaces are established for all modules for compatibility 
and data connectivity. 





– Sensor excitation, signal conditioning, signal amplification and signal 
(A/D) conversion. 
– Tailored for the specific application or sensor to be instrumented. 
• A third module normally provides power management functions to the 
Remote Station: 
– Battery monitoring and health status. 
– Specific algorithms to control “power on/off” cycles for all other 
modules. 
– Controlled by a very low power dedicated micro-controller. 
– This is a generic module in each Remote Station. 
• A fourth module provides embedded knowledge capability to the Remote 
Station: 
– A DSP contained in this module performs higher mathematical 
functions, statistical analysis more complex reasoning.  
– This module is also an application specific module. 
The Figure below illustrates the modules needed to meet these requirements: 
As can be seen all the requirements are met in this design and hence it forms a 
framework for any further development. To cross check if the system indeed satisfies 





Figure 13 Remote Station architecture 
All of the components in the system must operate in accordance with the system’s 
power budget. In a running system, the energy budget must be divided amongst 
several system services: 
• sensor sampling,  
• data collection,  
• routing and communication,  
• health monitoring and  
• network retasking.  
Environment monitoring applications may need other important services in addition 
to those mentioned in this section. These services include localization, time 





Data sampling and collection 
In environment monitoring the ultimate goal is data collection; sampling rates and 
precision of measurements are often dictated by external specifications. For every 
sensor we can bind the cost of taking a single sample. By analyzing the requirements 
we can place a bound on the energy spent on data acquisition. We trade the cost of 
data processing and compression against the cost of data transmission. We can 
estimate the energy required by data collection by analyzing data collected from 
indoor monitoring networks. 
 
Communications 
Power efficient communication paradigms for environment monitoring must include 
a set of routing algorithms, media access algorithms, and managed hardware access. 
The routing algorithms must be tailored for efficient network communication 
while maintaining connectivity when required to source or relay packets. 
 
Network Retasking 
As the researchers refine the experiment, it may be necessary to adjust the 
functionality of individual nodes. This refinement can take several different forms. 
Scalar parameters, like duty cycle or sampling rates, may be adjusted through the 






Health and Status Monitoring 
A major component of use to the application is one that monitors the sensor’s health 
and the health of neighboring sensors. Health and monitoring is essential for a variety 
of purposes; the most obvious is retasking. Although the health messages are not 
critical for correct application execution, their use can be seen as preventive 
maintenance. For this reason, we advocate a health and monitoring component that 
transmits status messages with lower latency in exchange for strict reliability. Health 
messages may be sent rather infrequently (about once per hour or less dependent on 
the duty cycle) with no guarantee on their delivery. 
 
The Figure below shows the software class that will address the requirements stated 





Figure 14 Software class 
 
A sensor when mounted has some constraints viz operational e.g. whether the range is 
adequate to allow uninterrupted monitoring, distance from adjacent sensor; for e.g. if 
an optical sensor is mounted such that it is obstructed by an opaque surface the sensor 
should be able to diagnose this error. The other constraint being physical wherein the 
location may be a problem and the sensor might not fit into the area drawn out for it. 
What this class illustrates is that upon installation the sensor will execute logic to see 







Figure 15 Constraints class 
 
 
This section covers fully all the requirements stated in chapter 3 for sensors. 
4.3 Building 
An intelligent building can be viewed as a system consisting of many individual 
entities, either “passive” such as doors, windows, furniture, or “intelligent”, i.e. 
capable of computing, holding and communicating their state, such as computer 
terminals, mobile communicators, sensors, actuators etc. These objects are fixed or 
mobile. However there is a line dividing the structure of the building and the 




the structural part of the building. The first two sections comprising the central and 
the remote architecture and the sections to follow cover the “intelligent” entities. 
 
The Interior of the building can be thought of as having a Structure, Functionality, 
and Other Systems. While the exterior consists of Surrounding, Environment 
 
Figure 16 Building explored 
Figure 16 above roughly decomposes a building class. Another attempt to get a macro 
view of the interior of the building containing aspects of interest and dedicated solely 







Figure 17 Building Class 
 
The class- Building is a key domain abstraction; the domain being the building that 
needs to be protected. It includes the area that needs to be protected along with the 
rooms and corridors. A control system is included to monitor the room continuously. 
 
4.3.1 Access Graphs  
 









Note: The lines indicated in the graph are not to scale and are non-directional. They 
















Figure 19 Access Graph 
 
The floor plan consists of a layout comprising of rooms and doors. Rooms in the 
layout can be thought of as nodes while doors between the rooms are lines connecting 
the nodes. According to graph theory, rooms are vertices and doors are edges.  The 











matrix A with entries aij. The rows and columns of the matrix represent vertices, 
while the entries in the body of the matrix represent whether or not the vertices have 
edges between them. The matrix is square, with n rows and columns, where n is the 
number of vertices. The entries in the matrix are of course symmetric about the 
diagonal – if room 1 is connected to room 2, room 2 is connected to room 1. Rooms – 
vertices – are not connected to themselves, so the diagonal entries are 0.  
The formal representation provided by the graph in Figure 19 makes it easier to 
define different aspects of the pattern of connection among rooms. The portrayal of 
the connections on the graph in the adjacency matrix facilitates computing 
quantitative measures of the pattern displayed by the graph. Aspects of the pattern for 
particular rooms that are important include depth, connectivity, control value, and 
integration. These measures can be used to describe relationships between rooms as 
they are envisioned on a floor plan. 
 
The graph in Figure 19 above gives the connectivity with rooms as nodes/vertices and 
doors as edges justified so that the carrier is at the entrance. A justified access graph 
requires choosing a door from which the interior in initially entered. The door 
becomes an edge, connecting a hypothesized exterior vertex to the vertex representing 
first room entered. The exterior vertex is called “the carrier” in space-syntax; in this 
case marked as C in the Figure. 
 




Once an entrance is made from the exterior (C), one can enter Room 1 and Room 2 
directly; one has access to Rear passage (1) directly. One has to follow the path Rear-
Room 5/Room3 to get to either rooms and finally the path Rear-Room3-Room4 to get 
to Room 4. Access to Room 4 is completely controlled by Room 3. 
The justified access graph makes it clear that some rooms are more accessible than 
others with rooms of equal depth being equally accessible. For example the Room 2 





  R 1 2 3 4 5 C 
R 0 0 0 1 0 1 1 
1 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
2 0 0 0 0 0 0 1 
3 1 0 0 0 1 0 0 
4 0 0 0 1 0 0 0 
5 1 0 0 0 0 0 0 
C 1 1 1 0 0 0 0 
Table 22 Adjacency Matrix 
4.3.2 Characteristics of the graph: 
 
Connectivity  
Connectivity of a single room is simply the number of doors into it. Summing the 
rows or columns of the adjacency matrix yields connectivity values for the rooms:  
            n 
    cij = ?  a ij 
           j=1 
Connectivity of a room can also be thought of at the number of routes into or out of 







Control is a measure of the extent to which a given room controls access to the rooms 
that are adjacent (immediately connected by a door) to it. Consider, as an example, 
two rooms, A and B, connected by a door. We are interested in the control value for 
A. If the only entry into B is the connection to A, then A controls access to B entirely. 
On the other hand, if B has connections to other rooms, in addition to A, then A has 
less control over access to B. In general, control for a room in inversely proportional 
to the connectivity of the adjacent rooms. The formula is:  
 
      n 
   ctrli    = ?  a ij *(1/cij) 
    j=1 
 
 
In other words, control for the i’th room can be computed by multiplying its 
adjacency vector – the row of 0’s and ‘1’s in the adjacency matrix – by the reciprocal 
of the connectivity values for all the rooms and summing the products. The products 
for rooms that are directly connected will equal the connectivity reciprocals, while 
they will equal 0 for those rooms that are not connected. The sum of products is 
therefore the sum of the connectivity reciprocals for the connected rooms.  
 
 
Room Depth Mean Depth Connectivity 1/c ctr 
R 1 1.5 3 0.333333 1.833333 
1 1 2.5 1 1 0.333333 
2 1 2.5 1 1 0.333333 
3 2 2 2 0.5 1.333333 
4 3 2.833333333 1 1 0.5 
5 2 2.333333333 1 1 0.333333 
C 1 1.666666667 3 0.333333 2.333333 






Depth: The accessibility of rooms within a structure to individuals entering from 
outside is determined by drawing a justified access graph. Rooms are assigned depths 
relative to the carrier, which are the number of edges (doors) crossed as one travels 
along the shortest path from the carrier to the room.  
Of course many buildings have multiple exterior entries. Here there are at least two 
analytical options. In the first, we connect multiple exterior doors to a single exterior 





  R 1 2 3 4 5 C 
R 0 2 2 1 2 1 1 
1 2 0 2 3 4 3 1 
2 2 2 0 3 4 3 1 
3 1 3 3 0 1 2 2 
4 2 4 4 1 0 3 3 
5 1 3 3 2 3 0 2 
C 1 1 1 2 3 2 0 
Table 24 Depth Matrix 
 
To extend this simple floor plan to account for an entire building consisting of floors, 
elevators, rooms etc; the following diagram representation is used as a starting point. 
In the access graph we primarily define rooms (vertices) and doors (edges). The 
relationship between the rooms is quantified by: 
1. the depth; number of doors one would pass to reach a room 
2. control; whether one room controls access to another 
3. connectivity; how well is a room connected 

























Figure 20 Space Hierarchy 
 
At the root of the space hierarchy is the building, which can be thought of as 
consisting of several floors. The floors which form the next level of the hierarchy are 
interconnected by elevators or staircases. Below the floors are the groupings of the 
rooms and finally at the bottom are the individual rooms. 
A building consists of several rooms arranged relative to each other. The chief 
components of such a layout would be the Class Room describing the types of rooms, 
the number of any individual room type, etc. The exact relations between the rooms 
will be characterized by a relationship class Relation.  Broadly the attributes of the 












1. Distance: specifies the distance between the two rooms. Depth, mean depth 
(depth of a room/ (total number of rooms-1)), travel time can be used to 
characterize this relationship. 
2. Control: Access to one room may be completely controlled by another, e.g. 
Room 4 in Figure 1 is completely controlled by Room 3. 
3. Connectivity: Quantifies if the room is well connected or not. In the example 
above the rear area has very high connectivity indicating that it has to be 
monitored more than say Room 4. 
4. is visible: a Boolean variable that will indicate the visibility relation between 
two rooms; For e.g. a value of 1 could indicate that an office is visible to a 
storage room 
5. Inside: states whether a room is inside another; for e.g. a value of one 
indicates that a storage room is inside an office. 
6. Connects to: =N; states that one room connects to a maximum of N of type 2 
rooms. E.g. a conference room connects to 1 office. 
7. Separated: would indicate that a certain class of rooms would be always 
separated from another class. 
8. Connectionthroughdoor: Specifies if the rooms connect through a door. Could 
be a Boolean variable that can take a value of 1 or 0. 
9. mintraveltime: could specify the minimum time taken to reach a room an 
inviolable constraint 





11. Connectedthroughducts: specifies if one room connects to another through a 
common duct. This is important in the case of a chemical or biological attack 
as it will help to trace the path of the agent. 
 
A floor can be considered as a collection of the rooms while maintaining the 
relationships between the rooms and without violating attributes like area, maximum 
number. 
 
We start with the first classification that of the class room which is a basic description 
of what rooms should have and the basic type of rooms contained in the building. The 
parent class room has attributes like length, width, height, number occupancy etc. 
These are inherited by the subclasses and each has its own function as a 
distinguishing factor.  
 
Certain attributes are used to characterize features of the room such as the maximum 
number of a particular type of room that can be there in a building (maxnumber) for 


















Figure 22 Relationship Class 
 
A room is defined as a super class consisting of various subtypes based on 
functionality such as office, storage etc. 
The relation between two rooms is specified through the relationship class. This class 
captures the above mentioned features that characterize the relationship between two 
rooms; whether they are adjacent, separated, connected via ducts etc. In doing this the 
quantitative measures described in section 1 can be used to explain relationships 
between different rooms. 
 
When a graph of all the rooms is created weighting each edge with the travel time 
between the rooms-each relationship can be checked. All rooms of a particular class 
must satisfy a relationship with another class. E.g. Certain checks include if two 
rooms with a given depth are placed closer to each other, or the area occupied 
condition is violated. While placing any room simple guidelines can be deciphered 
it’s proximity to another room or an exit. These cardinalities can be used to classify 





Rooms which are the lowest level of the space hierarchy can be grouped together to 
form suites, floors etc. Groups of rooms can be clubbed together and this can help to 
partition major areas like floors of the building. A group in the diagram will represent 
more than one room that should be located close together in a building.  Figure 12 
describes one such scenario where it might be required to place 2 offices always 










Figure 23 Floor Cluster 
 
 
The building class consists of several floors. The number of floors can be set by 
defining an attribute constraint in the class floor.  The floors are connected to each 





Figure 24 Floor Class 
Expanding further to include systems such as HVAC systems that provide ventilation 






































Floor plans with loops (Doors depiction to indicate presence of doors in the layout, 
does not indicate status of the door): 
 
 
Figure 27 Floor plan with loops  
 




























Table 25 Adjacency matrix 
 
 
Table 26 Quantitative measures 
 
 
Table 27 Depth matrix 
 
 
The changed values in depth are shown in the Table 27. Table 26 gives changes in the 
other measures. In line with our definitions of connectivity the value for the rooms 1 
and 2 have changed from their previous values to account for the increase in 
connectivity due to addition of doors. Rear Space now has the maximum connectivity 
and should be the area that needs to be monitored the most. Similarly, mean depth 




shows the increased routes in and out of rooms and increased connectivity between 
rooms. The exercise was a simple extension to the earlier example as doors 
introduced into the floor plans merely represent links between rooms which weren’t 
present earlier on. 
 
4.4 HVAC system class 
An HVAC system has to be especially guarded and monitored as it is a potential 
target for biological/chemical attack since it circulates air supply of the building. 
HVAC system and access graphs 
The first step for effective detection is isolating the source. Abnormal sensor 
readings, changes in room air quality as compared to other rooms etc are some of the 
measures that can be adopted to indicate the “source” of the agent.  
Once the potential source has been identified in the building; the focus would be on 
containing and isolating the threat. 
There are two ways a chemical/biological agent could spread in a building. 
Ø Doors: the connectivity of a room to other rooms can be used to identify 
which rooms are under immediate threat owing to the presence of the agent.  
Ø HVAC: the agent can spread through the duct and into other rooms connected 
via the duct network. 
These two components together constitute the directional graph and can be used to 














Figure 29 HVAC and Access Graph 
If a chemical/biological agent is present in Room 3 from Figure 29 and a 
corresponding connectivity matrix it is observed that the rear space(R), Room 2 and 
Room 4 are under immediate threat. Once this has been established an effective 
control can be designed to protect these rooms. The duct and door connectivity 
together provide an effective framework for the development of a 
detection/classification algorithm. 
Sensing Bio/Chemical substances 
In the "normal" operation, the air in a building will be continuously filtered in a 
passive mode so any chemical or biological agent is captured as soon as it arrives at 
the filters. Continuous filtration has the additional benefit of providing a clean 
background for sensors. The fastest sensors are those that simply detect the presence 
of biomass without being able to distinguish whether that biomass is a bio warfare 
agent or a naturally occurring substance such as skin cells, pollen, or mold.  
Since the filters normally maintain a low background level of biomass in the air, any 
sudden rise in internal concentration, such as might accompany a biological attack, is 













mode, techniques that are not appropriate for full-time, continuous operation might be 
used. For instance, high-power ultraviolet lamps may be turned on to kill any 
bioagent in the return air ducts even though these would not be used continuously 
because of concerns about operational cost. Another example would be to monitor air 
in the alternate ducts and switch supply to those ducts if contamination is observed in 
the operational ducts. 
  
If the building is not under attack, it returns to normal mode without the building 
occupants ever having been disturbed, an important consideration given the 
performance of today's sensors. These modes of operations are illustrated by the 










4.3.1 Actuator Class 
 
Figure 31 Actuator Class 
An actuator is an end device that translates the control logic of the sensor and central 
control unit together. They are of various types as indicated in the Figure above. 





4.5 Sensor Class 
 
Figure 32 Components of a sensor 
 
Senor as a system can be classified into the following broad categories: 













x. Input Value 
xi. Output Value 
xii. Precision 
2. Amplification/Filtering, A/D conversion etc 
i. Input value 







3. Data Storage and Processing 
i. Last measurement 
ii. Sampling frequency 
iii. Moving average 
iv. Set Point 








5. External interfaces 




The Figure below explains the relation between the phenomena measured and the 










Figure 34 Abstract level 
This is an abstract representation of a sensor. All sensors will have some basic 
abilities and they are classified here based on phenomena. Basically apart from the 
sensing mechanism used all sensor should be capable of the activities listed in the 
sensor class. Sensors can be defined as Active or Passive depending on their power 
supply requirements. Active sensors generate power and do not require an external 
source while passive do. The Figure below takes an orthogonal view into what lies at 




functionalities irrespective of its sensing mechanism. All the sensors have a physical 
cover, a communication port etc. 
 
 
Figure 35 Sensor object 
 
Each sensor internally will have an architecture as shown in Figure 10. The only 





 4.5.1 Example: Biological sensor 
The effective detection of biological agents in the environment requires a 
multicomponent analysis system because of the complexity of the environment. Other 
variables contributing to the effectiveness of detection of biological agents are the 
detection process itself and the efficient use of consumables in the field. Biological 
agent detection systems generally consist of four components: the trigger/cue, the 
collector, the detector, and the identifier. Figure 4?1 shows a flow diagram for a 
typical point detection automated architecture system. The function of these 
components is described in the remainder of this section, while section 5 will provide 










Trigger technology is the first level of detection that determines any change in the 
particulate background at the sensor, indicating a possible introduction of biological 
agents. Detection of an increase in the particulate concentration by the trigger causes 
the remaining components of the detection system to begin operation. The trigger 
function typically provides a means of continuously monitoring the air without 
unnecessary use of consumables, thus keeping the logistical burden of biological 
agent detection low. 
To reduce false positives (alarm with no biological agent) and false negatives (no 
alarm with agent), many detection systems combine trigger technology with a second 
detector technology (such as fluorescence that provides more selectivity) into a single 
technology known as cueing. 
Most effective cueing technologies can detect airborne particulates in near real time 
and can discriminate between biological agent aerosol particles and other particles in 
air, avoiding unnecessary system activation. For example, a cueing device monitors 
the air for particulates as does any other trigger device. When the particulate 
concentration increases, the cue determines if the particulates are biological in nature. 
The cue device generally uses a fluorescence detector to make this determination. If 




Sampling of the biological agent is a crucial part of the identification system. The 




collection devices must be employed. One type of collector pumps large volumes of 
air through a chamber where the air mixes with water. The water scrubs all the 
particulates from the air, resulting in a sample containing particulates suspended in 
water. Once collected in the water, the sample is further concentrated by evaporation 
of a portion of the water. After concentration, the sample moves into the analytical 
section of the biological agent detection system. 
 
Detector 
Once a sample has been collected/concentrated, it must be determined if the 
particulates are biological or inorganic in origin. To accomplish this, the sample is 
passed to a generic detection component that analyzes the aerosol particles to 
determine if they are biological in origin. This component may also classify the 
suspect aerosol by broad category (e.g., spore, bacterium, toxin/macromolecule, or 
virus). In its simplest form, the detector acts as a “gateway” for further analysis. If the 
sample exhibits characteristics of biological particles, it is passed through to the next 
level of analysis. If the sample does not exhibit such characteristics, it is not passed to 
the next level of analysis, thereby conserving analytical consumables. It is important 
to note that detection has traditionally taken place after the trigger function. For 
example, an aerosol particle sizer (APS) triggers, then a detector (e.g., flow 
cytometer) examines the aerosol for biological content. Many of the newer detection 
technologies combine the trigger and detection functionalities into a single 




detects a rise in particulates then determines if the particulates are of biological 
origin. If the sample is biological, the collector gathers a sample and passes it directly 
to the identifier. 
Identifier 
An identifier is a device that specifically identifies the type of biological agent 
collected by the system. Identifiers are generally limited to a preselected set of agents 
and cannot identify agents outside of this set without the addition of new identifier 
chemistry/equipment or preprogramming. Because the identifier performs the final 
and highest level of agent detection, it is the most critical component of the detection 
architecture and has the widest variety of technologies and equipment available. The 
information obtained from the identifier is then used to determine protection 
requirements and treatment of exposed personnel. 
 
 
4.6 System access 
 
The system access prevents unauthorized access and protects the premises from an 
intruder attack. It comprises of the card reader and the ID card-purpose being every 
employee is equipped with an ID card that they swipe in the card reader to gain 
access into the protected premise. It uses biometrics to strengthen the identification 
process as the ID card tells that the card belongs to the company while the biometric 











Chapter 5:  System Behavior 
 
Once the static structure is in place identifying all the objects of the system, the 
system behavior diagrams show the interactions between these objects as they 
achieve the various tasks chalked out for the system. 
5.1 Interaction Diagrams: 
Interaction diagrams model the behavior of use cases by describing the way groups of 
objects interact to complete the task.  The two kinds of interaction diagrams are 
sequence and collaboration diagrams.  
Interaction diagrams are used when it is required to model the behavior of several 
objects in a use case.  They demonstrate how the objects collaborate for the 
behavior.  Interaction diagrams do not give an in depth representation of the behavior 
Sequence diagrams, collaboration diagrams, or both diagrams can be used to 
demonstrate the interaction of objects in a use case.  Sequence diagrams generally 
show the sequence of events that occur.  Collaboration diagrams demonstrate how 
objects are statically connected.  Both diagrams are relatively simple to draw and 
contain similar elements. [13] 
 
5.1.1 Sequence diagrams  
Sequence diagrams demonstrate the behavior of objects in a use case by describing 
the objects and the messages they pass. Consider for example the Use case for Access 
control; in this the user submits a card which has an access code associated with it. 




prompt is issued for reentry of the code. The user is allowed to enter the code thrice 
before the card is confiscated and security alerted. 
 
The following sequence diagram illustrates the class objects and interaction between 
them that is needed to accomplish this entire card verification process: 
 
Figure 38 Card Verification 
 
A person swipes his ID card and enters code. The keyboard object communicates 
with the reader which has an inbuilt processor that checks the code, if there is an error 
or a match is not found the error message is displayed. At the same time the function 
will keep track of the number of times the code has been entered by incrementing 
variable “i”. If of course the code keyed in was right the door lock is opened and the 




of persons entering is more than one an alarm is sounded or if the number of times the 
code entered is >3 the card is captured, door is locked and security alerted. 
 
The following sequence diagram explains the messages exchanged when a threat is 
detected in the environment. The sensor that detects abnormality in the environment 
sets off an alarm as well as puts the signal on the network. If the threat is determined 
to be correct (See Sensor Fusion Chapter 6) the dampers are actuated to seal off the 
















Figure 39 Sensor Alarm 
The next sequence diagram explains the alarm generation process. It illustrated the 
response of the sensor on detecting an abnormality. An alarm is sounded and the 





Figure 40 Alarm 
 
The alarm system is set off after receiving messages from any sensor.  However this 
diagram is an abstraction of the redundant logic used by sensors for determining if a 
measurement is indeed violating its limits. The internal logic of the sensors is hidden 
and is shown in the sequence diagram covered in the Sensor Fusion chapter # 6. 
 
The next diagram explains the messaging that has to take place in order to protect the 
IS system form unauthorized access. This works in conjunction with the reader 
system, giving a two layered security system where the first prevents unauthorized 
access while the other makes sure that the person has passed all the appropriate 
channels before logging onto the IS system. Here the IS system checks for the user 
account after receiving the correct username and password. Once the account is 




premises. Only then does it let the person access the system. If the person has not 
passed through the appropriate channels the system alerts security. 
 
 
Figure 41 IS Security 
 
5.2 State and Activity Diagrams 
5.2.1 State Charts 
State diagrams are used to describe the behavior of a system.  State diagrams describe 
all of the possible states of an object as events occur.  Each diagram usually 
represents objects of a single class and tracks the different states of its objects through 





State diagrams demonstrate the behavior of an object through many use cases of the 
system. Not all classes will require a state diagram and state diagrams are not useful 
for describing the collaboration of all objects in a use case.  State diagrams are other 
combined with other diagrams such as interaction diagrams and activity diagrams. 
The following state diagram divides the system into 4 major states: 
 
1. Normal state: Indicating the system is fully functional, with all alarms reset 
and faults cleared. The transition out of this state is when an alarm occurs. 
 The system alert state is a super state comprising of two smaller states 
2. Check for False alarm: Here based on information received there is a 
transition to the maintenance state( this occurs if a false alarm is received) or a 
transition to the two sub states 
Ø Intruder threat: The threat is determined to be that of an intruder and 
appropriate actions are taken. Once the situation is restored back to 
normal(indicated by the setting of the Situation Normal flag to 1) a 
transition is made to the system normal state 
Ø Bio Threat: The threat is determined to be that of a chemical/biological 
agent and appropriate actions are taken. Once the situation is restored back 
to normal(indicated by the setting of the Situation Normal flag to 1) a 
transition is made to the system normal state 
3. System Wait: The system is normal but monitoring still continues, any further 
faults are logged and transitions are made to maintenance. Once timer expires 




4. Maintenance: All faults are attended and transition is to the normal system 




Figure 42 System Statechart 
The statechart in Figure 42 shows the various states the system is in when an 
employee attempts access to the system. The states explain the entire approach of 






     Figure 43 Access System Statechart 
 
5.2.2 Activity Diagrams  
Activity diagrams describe the workflow behavior of a system.  Activity diagrams are 
similar to state diagrams because an activity is the state of doing something.  The 
diagrams describe the state of activities by showing the sequence of activities 
performed.  Activity diagrams can show activities that are conditional or parallel. 
 
Activity diagrams are used in conjunction with other modeling techniques such as 
interaction diagrams and state diagrams.  The main reason to use activity diagrams is 
to model the workflow behind the system being designed.  Activity Diagrams are also 
useful for: analyzing a use case by describing what actions needs to take place and 
when they should occur; describing a complicated sequential algorithm; and modeling 
applications with parallel processes.  
System Operating 
Swipe Card 




















However, activity diagrams should not take the place of interaction diagrams and 
state diagrams.  Activity diagrams do not give detail about how objects behave or 
how objects collaborate.  
 
 
Figure 44 Authorized entry 
The activity diagrams show the sequence of events that have to be followed to 




regular authorized access. The system then continues with the verification process 
and enlists the steps to be taken to prevent unauthorized access and tailgating. It 
summarizes the sequential flow of events for authorized and unauthorized access into 




Figure 45 Alarm 
 
Alarm activation incase of intruder entry. The alarm action is accompanied by 









This activity diagram condenses all the use cases for the access into one single 








This covers the enrollment process. A standard procedure required for registering the 
user and building up the database. The whole process requires an authorized personal 
to take the steps of enlisting the employee into the system. 
 
Figure 48 Monitoring CB threat 
 
An activity diagram that explains the steps that need to be adapted in the wake of a 
chemical/biological attack. Here the focus is to switch to alternate ducts provide they 




of the suspected area is carried out and followed y a pressurization to prevent leaks 
into the environment. Thus containing the attack and not allowing it to spread. 
 
 
Figure 49 Error Checks 
Here a master/slave configuration is used. If a drift is observed in the measurements 
logic is used to determine whether the drift is +/- the tolerance levels. If it is control is 






Figure 50 Power Failure 
 
If the power supply to the system fails there has to be back up supply to provide 
uninterrupted service. The activity diagram illustrates how an uninterrupted power 


















Figure 51 IS system 
The steps to be taken to protect the IS system from any breach in security. If access 






Chapter 6: Sensor Fusion 
 
As per Requirement # 2 , the fault alarm must be kept low. This can be done if 
sensors collaborate and share their measurements to arrive at a consensus. This 
approach is called sensor fusion, not only does it increase the reliabilty of the 
measurement it also decreases the contingency of a false alarm.[25] 
6.1 Introduction 
A human being recognizes external environment by using many kinds of sensory 
information. By integrating these information and making up lack of information for 
each other, a more reliable and multilateral recognition can be achieved. Sensor 
Fusion realizes new sensing architecture by integrating multi-sensor information so 
that  reliable and multilateral information can be extracted, which can realize high 
level recognition mechanism. The fusion method must be designed carefully, 
because an inappropriate fuser can render the system worse than the worst 
individual sensor. 
Sensor fusion can be divided into three classes: complimentary sensors, competitive 
sensors, and cooperative sensors.  
Ø Complimentary sensors do not depend on each other directly but can be 
merged to form a more complete picture of the environment, for example, a 
set of radar stations covering non-overlapping geographic regions. 





Ø Competitive sensors each provide equivalent information about the 
environment. A typical competitive sensing configuration is a form of N-
modular redundancy. For example, a configuration with three identical radar 
units can tolerate the failure of one unit. This is a general problem that is 
challenging, since it involves interpreting conflicting readings.  
Ø Cooperative sensors work together to drive information that neither sensor 
alone could provide. An example of cooperative sensing would be using two 
video cameras in stereo for 3D vision. This type of fusion is dependent on 
details of the physical devices involved and cannot be approached as a general 
problem.There are two types of major algorithm areas Value Fusion and 
Detection Fusion; these topics are covered in detail in Chapter 8.Consider the 






Here the object has certain attributes: The position information determines where 




Figure 52 sensor fusion 
 
The sequence diagram illustrates how sensors group and communicate with each 
other to confirm information regarding measurements. When one sensor detects a 
threat, it passes the information to the next configured sensor that may/may not 
confirm the threat. If with the combined information from both the sensors the threat 





Sensor fusion not only makes the system more robust it also minimizes the likelihood 
of having non diagonal elements dominating the confusion matrix. In view of 
requirement# 2 a confusion matrix with diagonal elements>0 and non diagonal 
elements =0 is desired.  
A confusion matrix (Kohavi and Provost, 1998) contains information about actual and 
predicted classifications done by a classification system. Performance of such 
systems is commonly evaluated using the data in the matrix. The following table 
shows the confusion matrix for a two class classifier.[26] 
The entries in the confusion matrix have the following meaning in the context of our 
study: 
• a is the number of correct predictions that an instance is negative,  
• b is the number of incorrect predictions that an instance is positive,  
• c is the number of incorrect of predictions that an instance negative, and  
• d is the number of correct predictions that an instance is positive.  
  Predicted 
  Negative Positive 
Negative A b 
Actual 
Positive C d 
Table 28 Confusion Matrix 




• The accuracy (AC) is the proportion of the total number of predictions that 
were correct. It is determined using the equation:  
     [1] 
• The recall or true positive rate (TP) is the proportion of positive cases that 
were correctly identified, as calculated using the equation:  
      [2] 
• The false positive rate (FP) is the proportion of negatives cases that were 
incorrectly classified as positive, as calculated using the equation:  
      [3] 
• The true negative rate (TN) is defined as the proportion of negatives cases that 
were classified correctly, as calculated using the equation:  
      [4] 
• The false negative rate (FN) is the proportion of positives cases that were 
incorrectly classified as negative, as calculated using the equation:  
      [5] 
• Finally, precision (P) is the proportion of the predicted positive cases that 




      [6] 
 
We obviously desire that the matrix terms a and d be high while b and c be low. This 
chapter helps to quantify requirement# 2 that asks for a low fault rate. Chapter 8 
involves finding the minimum fault rate for a given deployment strategy that will not 








Chapter 7:  Characterizing Evacuation behavior with Agent 
UML 
7.1 An Introduction 
Agents are an extension of active objects, exhibiting both dynamic autonomy (the 
ability to initiate action without external invocation) and deterministic autonomy (the 
ability to refuse or modify an external request). Thus, our basic definition of an agent 
is “an object that can say ‘go’ (dynamic autonomy) and ‘no’(deterministic 
autonomy).” 
 
The Unified Modeling Language (UML) is gaining wide acceptance for the 
representation of engineering artifacts in object-oriented software. The view of agents 
as the next step beyond objects led to exploration of extensions to UML and idioms 
within UML to accommodate the distinctive requirements of agents. The result is 
Agent UML (AUML). Agent UML (AUML) synthesizes a growing concern for agent 
based software methodologies with the increasing acceptance of UML for object-
oriented software development. 
7.1.1 UML and AUML 
To make sense of and unify various approaches on object oriented analysis and 
design, an Analysis and Design Task Force was established within the OMG. By 
November 1997, a de jure standard was adopted by the OMG members called the 
Unified Modeling Language (UML) formalizes the methods of many approaches to 






Many researchers have argued that UML provides an insufficient basis for modeling 
agents and agent-based systems. Basically, this is due to two reasons: Firstly, 
compared to objects, agents are active because they can take the initiative and have 
control over whether and how they process external requests. Secondly, agents do not 
only act in isolation but in cooperation or coordination with other agents. Multiagent 
systems are social communities of interdependent members that act individually. To 
employ agent-based programming, a specification technique must support the whole 
software engineering process — from planning, through analysis and design, and 
finally to system construction, transition, and maintenance.  
A proposal for a full life-cycle specification of agent-based system development is 
beyond the scope for this thesis. Both FIPA and the OMG Agent Platform SIG are 
exploring and recommending extensions to UML. Moreover it is planned that within 
the European network of Excellence AgentLink a working group should be 
established on this topic. In this thesis, we will focus on a new subset of an agent-
based UML extension for the specification of the agent internal behavior of an agent 
and relating it to the external behavior of an agent using and extending UML class 
diagrams.  
7.2 UML Class diagrams –revisited 
 
First of all a closer look at the concepts of object oriented programming languages, 





In object oriented programming languages an object consists of a set of instance 
variables, also called attributes or fields, and its methods. Creating an object its object 
identity is determined. Instance variables are identifiers holding special values, 
depending on the programming languages these fields can be typed. Methods are 
operations, functions or procedures, which can act on the instance variables and other 
objects. The values of the fields can be either pre-defined basic data types or 
references to other objects. 
A class describes a set of concrete objects, namely the instances of this class, with the 
same structure, i.e. same instance variables, and same behavior, i.e. same methods. 
There exists a standard method 'new', to create new instances of a class. A class 
definition consists of the declaration of the fields and the method implementations. It 
consists of a specification or an interface part as well as of an implementation part. 
The specification part describes, which methods with which functionality are 
supported by the class, but not how the operation is realized. The 
implementation part defines the implementation / realization of the methods and is 
usually not visible to the user of the method. The access rights define which methods 
are visible to the user and which one are not. In most programming languages classes 
define also types, i.e. each class definition defines a type of the same name. 
Some programming languages allow in class definitions also the definition of class 
variables, which are shared by all classes, in contrast to instance variables belonging 




variables, in contrast to class variables which share the same storage. Class variables 
are often used as a substitute for global variables. Beyond class variables, there are 
often used class methods which can be called independently of a created object 
and are used as global procedures. 
7.2.2 Relating Objects with Agents 





Figure 53 Object vs. Agent 
 
We have autonomy, pro- and re-activity, the communication is based on speech act 
theory (communicative acts, CA for short), the internal state is more than only fields 
with imperative data types, and additional features. All these concepts have to be 




we have to distinguish between an agent class defining on the one side the type of an 
individual agent and being on the other side a blue print for individual agents, i.e. an 
(individual) agent is an instance of an agent class. Therefore we specify the schema of 
an agent class which is then used in programs as instantiated agents. An agent can be 
divided into the communicator - doing the physical communication, head - dealing 
with goals, states, etc. of an agent - and body - doing the pure actions of an agent. For 
the internal view of an agent we have to specify the agent's head and body. 
The reaction to events and pro-active behavior can be defined either by pro-active 
actions or agent head automata for pro-active behavior. Not only methods can be 
defined for an agent which are only visible to the agent itself, but actions which can 
be accessed by other agents. But in contrast to object orientation the agent decides 
itself whether some action is performed or not. [27] 
. 
 
7.2.3 Agent Class Diagrams  
A class diagram is a graphical view of the static structural model. A class in the sense 
of object oriented programming is a blueprint for objects, in our context an agent 
class has to be a blueprint for agents. A class describes a set of concrete objects, 
namely the instances of this class, with the same structure, i.e. same instance 
variables, and same behavior, i.e. same methods. There exists a standard method 
'new', to create new instances of a class. A class definition consists of the declaration 
of the fields and the method implementations. It consists of a specification or an 
interface part as well as of an implementation part. The specification part describes 




operation is realized. The implementation part defines the implementation / 
realization of  the methods and is usually not visible to the user of the method This 
can be either an instance of an agent or a set of agents satisfying some special role or 
behavior. These describe the kind of agents that exist in the system. In standard UML, 
there is a notation for active objects (with their own thread of execution).  
 
Agents must have their own thread of execution, but they are not mere objects: they 
have a knowledge of their environment (by means of sensors) and may act upon it (by 
means of effectors). They have abilities and can be requested to perform a certain 
action. This is different from invoking a method on them, as the agent may refuse to 
perform the action. Figure 42 (Agent class Person) shows the symbol we use for 
Agent Classes. White dots are used to indicate sensors and effectors. It is possible to 
connect other (Agent) classes to these dots to mean that the agent can sense or act 
upon that other class. Most of the times, Agent Classes have a statechart diagram 
specifying the agent behavior (see Figure 41).A static object diagram is an instance of 
a class diagram, where objects and their relationships may appear. It shows a 
snapshot of the state of the system at a point in time. Here we include Agents in this 
kind of diagrams. These are instances of Agent Classes, and are represented in a 
similar way (see Figure 41). 
7.2.4  Single room model 
This section deals with the simpler case, in which we consider evacuations of single 




rectangular grids. The Figure attempts to explain the behavior of the agent using a 
statechart. In the initial state the agent enters the “moving randomly” state. Time is 
discretized, so that movement of agents can be recorded. Agents with the capabilities 
described in Figure 42 can only see and move; they do not communicate. Once an 
agent sees a door, its objective is to move towards it.  
 
Figure 54 Statechart 
Figure 53 is a Statechart representing this behavior. Transitions in the model invoke 
methods (lookaround() and move()), which should be considered as the agent 
capabilities. These capabilities make use of the agent’s sensors and effectors which 
are described in the class diagram. When the agent is in the state 
1. Move Randomly. It looks around(lookAround()) and if it finds a door the 
transition move(door) causes it to go to moving to exit. If it doesn’t find the 
door it goes to morepopulated area which leads it back to the moving 
randomly state with other agents.The agent’s structure is shown in Figure 42.  
2. In the Moving to exit state the sensor will always move from one door to 







Figure 55 Person class 
 
Figure 54 shows an agent class Person, which has a sensor sight and an effector - 
legs. Relationship “is visible” and “move” state that the sensors and effectors can act 
(move) or sense(see). In this case, the sight sensor can sense either Doors, Walls or 
other person. The legs effector can act on Rooms i.e., agents can walk into/in the 
room. Agent capabilities move and lookaround are specified in the Agent class, these 
were used in the statechart of Figure 41. Attributes positionfromdoor_x and 
positionfromdoor_y are used to store the position of the door the agent is moving 
towards in the case he has seen a door before. A Person is situated in a room, and this 





The area of building is restricted to consist of a room made of several doors and 
walls. Doors are placed in walls with the relationship has. The dimensions of the 
room are stored in attributes breadth, height and length. The door coordinates are 
stored in its attributes. The interaction between the environment and the agents is 
expressed by using the sensor/effector notation.  
 
Figure 56 An agent diagram 
 
Figure 55 shows an agent diagram that reflects the way in which an agent can sense 
the presence of doors or other agents. The Figure shows a situation in which an agent 
(r1) is able to see another agent (r2) and a door. The condition for this to happen is 




7.2.5 Extending the model for multiple rooms  
In this section, we consider buildings with multiple rooms. The agent structure must 
be extended with a “mental” representation of the map of the building to guide the 
agent in his navigation towards the exit. 
 
Considered here are two situations:  
1. in the first one the agent does not have any a prior knowledge of the building 
layout, he builds his mental map while exploring the building looking for the 
exit.  
2. In the second situation, we assume that the agents have partial or total 
information about the building.  
 
In both cases, the mental map is used by the agent to navigate trough the building.  
 
Class Building has been introduced, composed by a number of rooms. Class Door has 
been extended with the attribute type indicating if the door is an exit or leads to 
another room. Inner doors are connected to other inner doors leading to other rooms; 
exit doors are not connected to other doors, as they lead to the outside. 
The mental map of the environment the agent builds and uses for navigation is 
shown. The agent is able to recognize a room if he has been in the room before. The 
same happens with doors inside rooms. The agent also remembers if he has explored 
the door before or not. This is because as per the statechart in Figure 45 the agent 




have been extended with the possibility to memorize new rooms or doors as they are 
discovered. If the agent has a prior knowledge of the building map, then this 
capability guides the agent through the  rooms towards the exit. If the agent does not 
have a prior knowledge, then his mental map may not be complete, and several 
situations can arise. In the first case, if he knows an exit door in the current room, this 
is the door it will take. If an exit door is not present in the current room, then the 
agent moves out of the current room and looks for it in other rooms. 
 
 
Figure 57 Class Diagram for multiple rooms  
 
In the statechart diagram below the agent is assumed to be in a room. It identifies 
three possible states in the superstate where the agent is trying to get to the exit. The 




1. does the agent know the exit door- in this case the agent moves directly to the 
Moving to exit door state. This state evaluates when the exit is in the room the 
agent currently is in. 
2. The second state is when agent does not have knowledge of the exit and enters 
the moving randomly superstates. This has two possible states one is where 
the agent moves from one room to another and checks for the exit.  So by 
default it enters the state in new room. The agent checks for the door,  if the 
door is present and is the exit the exit_door causes a transition to the Moving 
to Exit Door state. If it is not the exit the agent moves to the Move to inner 
door state 
3. In this state the agent comes out of the door and checks his location if the 
location is familiar and he knows the location of the exit he moves towards the 
exit if not he moves to the next room being the one it hasn’t entered before. 
On exiting from both the states in moving randomly the agent memorizes the 












Chapter 8:  Tradeoff Studies – Cost vs. Performance 
 
Two types of tradeoff studies are considered in the following sections. The first study 
is that of a card reader system used for access control. It is designed to prevent 
unauthorized access with the conflicting requirements of minimizing time and 
maximizing reliability while keeping costs at a minimum. The other study is of 
positioning sensors in an area so as to ensure redundancy, detect threats with a low 
fault rate and at a low cost.  
 
8.1 One Dimensional Solution 
 
Using Depth as a main control factor an algorithm was devised to switch the sensors 
depending on the inputs received. This basically switches on the sensor in a room at a 
distance of a single door to the room that has been entered. A major premise here is 
that upon receiving a trigger the sensors of the closest rooms should be alert. The 
problem was implemented using Visual Basic for Macros in Excel 
This is a one dimensional solution using mainly a trigger to operate a group of 
sensors. For e.g. as per Fig. 58, when an intruder enters a room the nearest sensors 
will be triggered from their sleep state.  
Assume if the object of interest is in R4 and the intruder knows that  
Then the potential path of the intruder would be 
  Entrance-Rear-Room3-Room4  
When the entrance button is selected the closest rooms viz; room1, room2 and the 
rear space are in an alert state. The depth matrix is sampled to get the proximity 




entrance are alert. If the door is locked in R4 then there is no reason for the sensor to 
pick up but as soon as the door in Room 3 is opened the sensor should be switched on 
as Room 3 controls full access to room 4.  
This way the path of an intruder can be tracked by adaptively switching on sensors.  
  
The following illustrations show the status when each room is entered. 
Now indicates the sensor is switched on 


















Figure 62 Room 4 entered 
 
 
   
The sheet used for calculations and running the macros is shown below 
 
Figure 63 Worksheet 
Using the logic of closest rooms getting triggered to alert state the results for the 






Figure 64 Entrance 
 
When the main door is opened the closest rooms are obtained from the depth matrix 







Figure 65 Room 1 
 
When room 1 is entered the closest rooms are obtained from the depth matrix and the 
area to the main entrance and the rear space is triggered to Alert state. 
 





When room 2 is opened the closest rooms are obtained from the depth matrix and 




Figure 67 Room 3 
 







Figure 68 Rear 
 
When the rear space is entered room3, 1, 5, main entrance.  
 
 






When the room 5 is entered rear space is alerted. This is a one dimensional solution to 
the problem. However there are other operations that can be used to ensure protection 
against intruders and this can be done using data from multiple sensors.  
 
8.2 Cost-Performance tradeoff sensor network 
8.2.1 Introduction 
The sensor network considered can be used to monitor the environment, detect, 
classify and locate specific events, and track targets over a specific region. Examples 
of such systems are in surveillance, monitoring of pollution, agriculture or civil 
infrastructures. The deployment of sensor networks varies with the application 
considered. It can be predetermined when the environment is sufficiently known and 
under control, in which case the sensors can be strategically hand placed. The 
deployment can also be  undetermined when the environment is unknown or hostile 
in which case the sensors may be deployed by other means, generally resulting in a 
random placement.[28] 
 
We consider deployment strategies for sensor networks performing target detection 
over a region of interest. In order to detect a target moving through the region, 
sensors have to make local observations of the environment and collaborate to 
produce a decision that reflects the status of the region covered [29]. This 
collaboration requires local processing of the observations, communication between 




sensors depend on their position the performance of the detection algorithm is a 
function of the deployment.  
 
One possible measure of the goodness of deployment for target detection is called 
path exposure. It is a measure of the likelihood of detecting a target traversing the 
region using a given path. The higher the target detection, the better the deployment. 
The set of paths to be considered may be constrained by the environment.  
 
In this study, the deployment is assumed to be random which corresponds to many 
practical applications where the region to be monitored is not accessible for precise 
placement of sensors. The room under consideration is divided into a 10 X 10 grid 
and random placement of sensors is allowed. The focus of this study is to determine 
the number of sensors to be deployed to carry out target detection in a region of 
interest. The tradeoffs lie between the fault rate, the cost of the sensors deployed, and 
the redundancy used. 
 
8.2.2 Model Used 
Consider a 10 X 10 room with n sensors deployed at locations Si, i = 1…n. A target at 
location u emits a signal which is measured by the sensors. The signal from the target 
decays as a polynomial of the distance. If the decay coefficient is k, the signal energy 
of a target at location u measured by the sensor at si is given by  
   





where K is the energy emitted by the target and ||u- si || is the geometric distance 
between the target and the sensor. Depending on the environment the value k 
typically ranges from 2.0 to 5.0 [4]. Energy measurements at a sensor are usually 
corrupted by noise. If Ni denotes the noise energy at sensor i during a particular 
measurement, then the total energy measured at sensor i, when the target is at location 
u, is  
  Ei(u) = Si(u) + Ni       (8) 
 
The sensors collaborate to arrive at a consensus decision as to whether a target is 
present in the region. There are two basic approaches for reaching this consensus: 
Value fusion and Decision fusion [31].  
 
In value fusion, one of the sensors gathers the energy measurements from the other 
sensors, totals up the energy and compares the sum to a threshold to decide whether a 
target is present. If the sum exceeds the threshold, then the consensus decision is that 
a target is present. In contrast, in decision fusion, each individual sensor compares its 
energy measurement to a threshold to arrive at a local decision as to whether a target 
is present. The local decisions (1 for target present and 0 otherwise) from the sensors 
are totaled at a sensor and the sum is compared to another threshold to arrive at the 
consensus decision. In some situations, value fusion outperforms decision fusion and 
vice versa. 
 
8.2.3 Value  Fusion. 
The probability of consensus target detection when the target is at location u is 
 





where ? is the fusion threshold. The noise processes at the sensors are assumed to be 
independent and white Guassian. Due to the presence of noise the sensors may 
incorrectly decide that the target is present even though there is no target in the field/  
The probability of a consensus false target detection is  
 
   ? Ni = ?                 (10) 
 
8.2.4 Example  
Assumptions: 
 
Assume the area of interest is can be thought of as a 10 X 10 unit2 grid. The sensor 
locations will be decided by the permissible range between them which is assumed to 
be 1 unit. Assume the noise process at each sensor is Gaussian with mean 0 and 
variance 1.  Further assume that the sensors use value fusion to arrive at a consensus 
decision. Then, from Equation 2, we chose a threshold ? = 3.0. The target emits an 
energy K = 12 and the energy decay factor is 2. The probability of detection is 
computed using equation 7. The constraints to this problem are that cost has to be 
considered while deployment. The cost includes the cost of the sensor as well as the 
cost of deployment. Assumptions made here are that if the sensor is closer to the 
target its cost is higher.  This allows the two constraints cost and detection to fight 










The tradeoff study is defined as: 
 
 
Objective function:  
Min ? Noise so that reading is as accurate as possible 
 
Constraints -  
Detect Target -? probabilities should be = threshold 




8.2.5 Problem Formulation: 
 
Sensor distance matrix 
  1 2 3 4 5 
1 0 5.157832 5 9.181756 5.713798 
2 5.157832 0 9.567374 5 5 
3 5 9.567374 0 12.21903 7.343005 
4 9.181756 5 12.21903 0 5.068564 
5 5.713798 5 7.343005 5.068564 0 
Table 29 Matrix 
The inter sensor distance is calculated to specify the range each sensor must have 
while the solver evaluates different sensor positions. This prevents one sensor to be 
placed on another or on the origin which would be the target position. The distance 
from the target is the geometric distance and the detection probability is derived from 
equation 1 while the noise is determined as a Gaussian distribution and a property of 
the sensor. The more the distance the greater the noise. But the closer the sensor the 






Figure 70 Trade off sheet 
The select sensor column is a Boolean variable that allows for the selection of the 
sensor. The number of sensors selected can be set as a constraint as the amount of 
redundancy required. As the redundancy increases the performance improves as the 
detection is the sum of the individual sensor measurements, but the cost and likewise 
noise also increased. Linear programming is used to minimize the noise by varying 
the locations of the sensors and without violating the constraints of cost, inter-sensor 
range and integer values for selection. The results of the runs can be found in the 
appendix; the graph below summarizes the relation between cost, threshold for 
detection and the noise. These results were obtained by keeping range constant and 
























Figure 71 Detection vs. Cost 
 
Since the detection improves as the sensors are placed closer to the target which is 
possible only at a higher cost the curve for detection vs. cost goes upwards with cost 
increase. While noise drops as cost increases as the sensors are closer to the target and 






















Figure 72 Noise vs. Cost 
A second study was carried out by varying the number of sensors that should be used. 
Here the number of sensors was varied from 1 to 5 and the cost constraint allowed 4 






















Figure 73 Noise vs. Cost -Vary number of sensors 
 
As the chart indicates noise levels reduce considerably with just a single sensor as it 




cost does increase too but the performance deteriorates. So in this case having more 
number of sensors is not a good tradeoff. The higher curves show the poor 
performance as compared to the lower ones viz the ones limited to 1 and 2 sensors. 
The graph of threshold vs. cost attests the statement above. 
 
Figure 74 Detection vs. Cost -Vary number of sensors 
 
8.2.6 Conclusion 
The tradeoff study can be formulated with any assumptions and many other 
constraints. However for the given problem keeping in mind redundancy as a major 
criteria and cost the next the curve for 2 sensors is selected as the optimal operating 
curve. Two sensors assure redundancy good performance at a low cost. The selection 
of the Pareto point on the performance graphs is now trivial. From the graph of cost 
vs. noise we see that the point that can be considered is  
 
Point No Noise Cost Detection 
1 0.08414 6.75 4.442 
2 0.069 7 4.82 
3 0.06367 7.25 5.197 



















4 0.0615 7.5 5.59 
5 0.0609 7.75 6.0123 
6 0.069 8 6.06 
Table 30 Conclusion 
Point # 5 gives a very good performance at a higher price while point number 4 is a 
good tradeoff between the two conflicting requirements and hence that becomes our 
Pareto point. This point is not the optimal point for the design but for the given data 
and constraints this is the most feasible point that satisfies all constraints. 
Extending this solution to combining logic using sensor probabilities; 
Consider the case when an entry is attempted at C, there are two sensors combined to 
explain the type of entry. Say sensor S1 is good at detecting  an entry alone but not the 
type of entry (forced/authorized) whereas sensor S2 can indicate the type of entry but 
has overall poor detection capabilities. Consider a single state x of the system can 
take on one of two values: 
. x1: authorized entry has been attempted. 
. x2: unauthorized entry has been attempted 
. x3: no entry has been attempted 
Sensor1 observes x and returns three possible values: 
. z1: Observation of an authorized entry. 
. z2: Observation of an unauthorized entry. 
.z3: No entry observed. 
 





For a fixed state, it describes the probability of a particular observation being made 
(the rows of the matrix). For an observation it describes a probability distribution over 
the values of true state (the columns) and is then the Likelihood Function Ë(x). 
A second sensor which makes the same 3 observations as the first sensor but whose 




whereas Sensor S1 is good at indicating an entry has been attempted; sensor S2 
indicates the type of entry and has overall poorer detection capabilities. 
With a uniform prior, when an observation z=z1 is made the posterior is the first 
column of the likelihood matrix of sensor 1 and 2 
  P (x|z1) = (0.45, 0.1, 0.45) 
Overall likelihood function for the combined information from both the sensors is 
  P12 (z1, z2|x) = P1 (z1|x) P2 (z2|x) 
Observe z1=z1 and z2=z1 and assuming a uniform prior the posterior is 
  P (x| z1, z1) = a P12 (z1, z1|x) = a P1 (z1|x)*P2 (z1|x) 
Taking log 
  = (L (z1|x)) + L (z1|x) +C 




  = (-1.597,-3.1011,-3.1011) +C 
  = (-0.3680,-1.8721,-1.8721) 
 
Where the constant C=1.299 is found through normalization (which in this case 
requires the anti-logs sum to one) 
Here sensor S2 adds information to help discern the type of entry into the area of 
interest and significantly adds value to information provided by sensor S1. 
For the example considered the strategy devised is to use sensor fusion to cover the 
map while keeping cost low and accuracy high. We combine information from two 
inexpensive sensors that give a rough estimate of the position and information from 











Cost < Budget 
Detection => threshold 
Inter-sensor distance => unit 
 
 
For the inexpensive sensors; we have two sensors which measure position of the 
target. The sensor measurement has a given confidence. For the sensors the center, or 
mean, of the distribution is the estimated location of the object and the standard 
deviations along the major and minor axes of the distribution correspond to estimates 




corresponds to the conditional probability that the object is in any location, given the 
observation. 
For S1 (sensor 1); the probability of estimation of S1 in the x-axis is 88% and that in 
the y-direction is 40%. Sensor S2 has an estimation of 50% and 95% respectively. 
s x1 = 2 and s y1 = 3 
For S2 (sensor 2) 
s x2 = 3 and s y2 = 1 
 
Provided two observations are independent and drawn from normal distributions, the 
observations can be merged into an improved estimate by multiplying the 
distributions.  
• Sensor measurements: z1 z2 with covariance matrices P1 P2 from two different 
sensors 








Based on this equation for a target position of (2, 5) we get an estimate of (2.876, 
4.6875) with a deviation of s (1.2, 0.75) Combining this information with that 
obtained from the expensive sensors (see section on Sensor fusion for tradeoff with 
sensors); we get a revised estimate of the error in K by adjusting the previous error 
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The resulting estimate is now adjusted with estimate from the expensive sensors and 






Based on this equation for a target position of (2, 5) we get a corrected estimate of 
(2.0015, 4.99913) with a deviation of s  (0.002069, 0.00207) 
Initially the optimum solution of the location is found for target position (0, 0). After 
which a sensitivity analysis was done to see which of the positions satisfies all target 
position from nx = 0….10 and ny = 0….10 
 
The tradeoff is solved for all target positions by maintaining some positions constant 
and reducing the degree of freedom, until a feasible set of locations is reached that 
gives the best solution for the given problem requirements and constraints. This set is 
(1.083, 6.153), (5.74, 4.32), (2, 1), (5.028, 9.273), (10, 10) while maintaining cost at 



















































Note: In the graph below there exists an error between the sensor output and the 
actual location. However the error is small of the order of 10-3 and cannot be 



















8.2 Card Reader system 
8.2.1 Measures of Effectiveness  
An Intelligent Sensor Network for the protection of a building serves to protect the 
building from any untoward incident. It should thwart any possible threat to the 
system. Though the potential threats to such a system are numerous only one type of 
threat (Unauthorized access) is considered in this section. The Measure of 
Effectiveness for such a system should include the system reliability and accuracy. It 
should also include the level of redundancy incorporated in the system to reduce 
potential danger due to a sub system outage or malfunctioning. Since protection of 





















8.2.2 Performance characteristic 
Ø Minimizing the Cost: The system should provide maximum benefits such as 
tamper proof environment resistant, built in back up power supplies etc at 
minimum cost. 
Ø Maximizing the reliability would concentrate on features of the system such 
as tamper proof, environment resistance. It would also depend on the 
redundancy built into the system 
Ø Minimizing the time  required to clear a single employee: This is a direct 
measure of the speed of the system. If the system takes considerable time in 
clearing one employee the idea might not be feasible 
8.2.3 Decision Variables 
Ø Time taken by system look up: The time taken by the system is the service 
rate of the readers. This, in the current study is a choice between two 
manufacturers of card readers. 
Ø Number of card readers: This variable decides the cost, system reliability 
and also the time taken to clear an employee. If the number of readers is more 
than the queue lengths are smaller but the reliability is lower and the cost is 
higher.  
Ø Number of engineers: This variable decides the cost of the system 
 
8.2.4 Formulation:  
1. Minimize the cost 




Ø Cost of The reader and scanner  
Ø Choice between 2 makes (satisfying requirements) X1, X2 (Boolean 
variables giving choice between the two makes) Cost of backup power 
supply: Redundant supply available choices two makes Y1 and Y2 
(Boolean variables giving choice between the two makes)  
Ø Cost of software for networking capabilities; K1&K2(Boolean variables 
giving choice between the two makes)  
Ø Cost of engineers developing database 
  W= Number of engineers deployed. Assume that engineers are paid @ 
  25$/hour. Number of hours= 4  
  
Total Cost =R* (X1D1+X2D2) + (Y1*DB1+Y2*DB2+K1*X1+K2*X2+ 25* 4* W 
 where 
  R= number of card Readers  
 
2. Maximize Reliability 
 Reliability of card reader = Rcr, Reliability of scanner= Rscan, Reliability of 
 card= Rcard . Reliability of tamper proof covering= Rtap, Reliability on adverse 
 environmental conditions= Renv 
  
Reliability (maximize) 
Reliability= (Rcard)^( R*X)* (Rbattery)^(R*Yj)* (Rcomm)^(R*Kj)  (11) 
èreliability is the product of independent component reliabilities. 
 with Xi =Boolean variable giving manufacturer; i= 1,2; Yj =Boolean variable 
 giving manufacturer; j= 1,2; With ki =Boolean variable giving manufacturer; 





3. Minimize Time, 
Minimize Time taken to clear one employee 
0.5*(ca^2+cp^2) *(?)^ ((sqrt (2*R+2)-1)) /(µ*(1-( ?))*R)< N1  (12) 
 
8.2.5 Mapping temporal behavior: Queuing models  
The table below records the activity in a building. We use this data to get the inter 
arrival times for employees. Typically as in any other building the activity is marked 
by peaks when people arrive in the morning and leave in the evening. In between 
these peaks are those characterized by lunch breaks or early leavings. This data is a 
sample for a day, averaged from data collected over a month and is used for this study 
 
Hour # of people Arrival Rate 
600-700 75 0.020833333 
700-800 80 0.022222222 
800-900 64 0.017777778 
900-100 14 0.003888889 
1100-1200 15 0.004166667 
1200-1300 48 0.013333333 
1300-1400 65 0.018055556 
1400-1500 45 0.0125 
1500-1600 10 0.002777778 
1600-1700 20 0.005555556 
1700-1800 70 0.019444444 
1800-1900 60 0.016666667 
1900-2000 34 0.009444444 
Mean 46.1538462 0.012820513 
Stdev 25.09929 0.006972025 
Table 31 Activity in a building 





















































Activity in a building
 
Figure 78 Histogram 
Having modeled the activity of the building and having arrived at an inter arrival time 
we need to develop a model that will capture the interarrival behavior and the number 
of servers that need to be installed to cater to the employees in order to minimize 
waiting times. There are two major factors in the system: 
Ø Cost of providing service: cannot afford many idle servers. 
Ø Cost of employee waiting time: employee will have to wait in longer queues 






Figure 79 Tradeoff point 
The figure shows the tradeoff between two conflicting requirements and the point that 
serves as an effective compromise between the two requirements. This point is not the 
optimal point but a point that provides a feasible solution which satisfies all the 
requirements. For the temporal behavior queuing theory is used to characterize the 
behavior of the card system. A parallel is drawn between the clients as the employees 
trying to gain access and the card readers as the server.  
Characteristics of Queue models[32] 
1. Calling population 
• infinite population: leads to simpler model,  
• Finite population: arrival rate is affected by the number of employees 





2. System capacity 
• The number of employees that can be in the queue or under service. 
• An infinite capacity means no customer will exit prematurely. 
3. Arrival process 
• For infinite population, arrival process is defined by the interarrival 
times of successive customers 
• Arrivals can be scheduled or at random times 
  
4. Queue behavior describes how the customer behaves while in the queue 
waiting balking - leave when they see the line is too long; renege - leave after 
being in the queue for too long; jockey - move from one queue to another  
5. Queue discipline 
• FIFO - first in first out (most common) 
• FILO - first in last out (stack) 
• SIRO - service in random order 
• SPT - shortest processing time first 
• PR - service based on priority 
 
6. Service Times 
• random: mainly modeled by using exponential distribution or 
truncated normal distribution (truncate at 0). 
• Constant 




• Parallel - multiple servers are operating and take customer in from the 
same queue.  
• Serial - customers have to go through a series of servers before 
completion of service 
• combinations of parallel and serial. 
 
Characteristics of the model also include values for  
·λ arrival rate (in customers per time unit) 
·m service rate of one server (in service/transaction per time unit) 
 
Performance metrics 
·ρ average utilization factor, percentage the server is busy. 
·Lq average length of queue 
·L average number of employees in the system 
·Wq average waiting time in queue 
·W average time spent in the system 
·Pn Probability of n employees in the system 
 
Utilization i.e. the fraction of time the server is busy is defined as a ratio of the arrival 
rate to the service rate 
 





For this study we assume a G/G/ k model which is a model that has a general arrival 
distribution a general service pattern and has multiple servers. We do this to 




General interarrival time distribution with mean m and std. dev. = sa 
General service time distribution with mean m and std. dev. = sp 
Multiple servers (k) 
First-come-first-served (FCFS) 
 
The equation below is the model used to calculate the waiting time of the employee 
when there are k readers in the building.[33] 
Average waiting times (approximate)     (14) 
 
As per the model the waiting time increases with square of arrival or service time 
variation, it decreases as the inverse of the number of servers. In the study: 
Service rate is defined as time taken for server to complete one transaction= 1sec in 
this case. The service rates provided by 2 manufacturers are 1 and 2.5 secs. If we 
assume that the total time taken to clear one employee is 15 secs including employee 










































The model was run by varying time and reliability. Reliability was varied only 
between two points 80 and 90% as a probability lower than this is unacceptable. From 
the table below the Pareto point is identified as #7 and # 8. Since # 7 satisfies both the 
requirements selection in this case is easy.  During the runs certain infeasible 
solutions were also recorded as indicated with an *. These points provide a solution 





















Runs Constraint(<Time &>Rel) x1*y1*k1 R C  W=Wq+1/mu T Re 
1 <2.2&80 1 1 2.9 15.53339 0.53339 0.9702
2 <2&90 1 1 2.9 15.53339 0.53339 0.9702
3 <1&80 1 1 2.9 15.53339 0.53339 0.9702
4 <1&90 1 1 2.9 15.53339 0.53339 0.9702
5 <0.5&80 1 2 5.6 15.11337 0.113368 0.9413
6 <0.5&90 1 2 5.6 15.11337 0.113368 0.9413
7 <0.05 1 3 8.3 15.039 0.039 0.91
8 <0.03 1 4 11 15.01645 0.01645 0.886
9 <0.03& 90 * 1 3.27 9.05 15.03 0.03 0.9
10 <0.02&90* 1 3.48 9.6 15.025 0.025 0.9
11 <0.02&80 1 4 11 15.0165 0.0165 0.886
12 <0.01&80 1 5 13.7 15.0079 0.0079 0.86
13 <0.01&90* 1 4.666 12.8 15.0099 0.0099 0.87
14 <0.005&90* 1 3.48 9.6 15.025 0.025 0.9
15 <0.005&80 1 6 16.4 15.00416 0.00416 0.83
16 <0.003&80 1 7 19.1 15.0023 0.0023 0.8
17 <0.001&80* 1 7.38 20.11 15.0019 0.0019 0.8
   
Table 32 Result 
*Infeasible 
Possible solution point 7 and 8 
 
The graph chalks out the relationship between the requirements. As is seen from the 
first graph the relationship of cost vs. time is one which gives the best result at the 
highest cost. The cost though has to be kept lower hence a point that ensures the 
waiting time is low and the cost is reasonable has to be picked. Points 7 & 8 are high 




































Figure 81 reliability vs. Time 























Figure 82 cost vs. reliability 
8.2.5 Conclusion 
The Pareto point is decided on the basis that it gives the best results for all three 
objectives. Since reliability is an important criterion in access control system it is 
important to maintain reliability at least< 0.90. Also a system that doesn’t give a 
reliability of 0.9 might incur additional losses in repair and downtime. The Cost has 
to be kept low, however for an identification system cost is not the most important 
criteria.  Also the number of readers in a system should be such that the queue 
waiting times are within specifications. Keeping these conditions in mind the  
Pareto point of time <0.05&reliability >90 giving a result of Number of readers: R= 















Chapter 9 Conclusion 
 
The thesis thus supplies a framework that can be adapted while designing a security 
system for a building. A systematic step-by-step approach plugs in different aspects 
of the behavior that can be used as templates for future system.  
 
The reusability component is maintained by not using specifics thereby rendering the 
system useless for future work. The static and dynamic models can be used as 
guidelines for further expansion and in depth design of a real complex system. The 
tradeoff study summarizes a technique that can be used in multi criteria decision 
making. A technique which is mathematical not given to heuristics. 
UML provides an exceptionally good framework to envision the system piecewise 
and can be extended to aUML easily using some of the standard notations and if there 
is a need t model proactive and reactive behavior.  











ANSI/ISO/IEC 7811-3 specifies in detail the location of embossed characters on an 
ID-1 card, and Part 4 specifies the location of magnetic stripes. As illustrated in 
Figure, two areas for embossing are specified. The first, whose center line is 21.42 
mm above the bottom edge of the card, or just below the center line of the card, 
allows for up to 19 card identification number numerals to be embossed. Just below 
this is an additional area of approximately 14.53 mm by 66.04 mm in which 4 rows of 
27 characters each can be used to form a name and address field. This is offset at least 
2.41 mm from the bottom of the card and 7.65 mm from the left edge; the embossed 
characters are raised toward the front side of the card. If a magnetic stripe is included 
on the card, it is found near the top, on the back side of the card. The specifications 




Figure: Embossing and magnetic stripe locations. 
 
Two variants of magnetic stripes can be found on ID-1 identification cards; the form 
and location of these are defined in ANSI/ISO/IEC 7811-4 (for read-only tracks) and 
Part 5 (for read/write tracks). One of these is 6.35 mm tall by 79.76 mm wide, 
positioned no more than 5.54 mm from the top edge of the card and on the back face 
of the card. This magnetic stripe supports two recording tracks, each of which is 
intended to be a read-only track.  
 
The Business Model for Identification Cards 
 
By following the ISO standards through several interconnected specifications for 
identification cards, it is possible to go beyond just the description of physical and 
electronic characteristics of the card. They have arrived at a business model from 
which inferences can be made regarding how cards will be manufactured, what 
groups will actually distribute the cards to end users, and some of the operations to be 
performed by the end users of the identification cards. For example, the 
ANSI/ISO/IEC 7811-1 specification defines two terms reflecting the “distribution 
state” of a card:  
•  Unused card—A card that has been embossed with all the characters required for its 
intended purpose but has not been issued.  
•  Return card—An embossed card after it has been issued to the cardholder and 
returned for the purpose of testing.  




•  Unused unencoded card—A card possessing all components required for its 
intended purpose that has not been subjected to any personalization or testing 
operation. The card has been stored in a clean environment without more than 48-
hour exposure to daylight at temperatures between 5 degrees C and 30 degrees C and 
humidity between 10% and 90%, without experiencing thermal shock.  
•  Unused encoded card—An unused, unencoded card that has only been encoded 
with all the data required for its intended purpose (for example, magnetic encoding, 
embossing, electronic encoding).  
•  Returned card—An embossed or encoded card after it has been issued to the 
cardholder and returned for the purpose of testing.  
DIN ISO 7810 "Identification cards" 
  
ANSI/ISO/IEC 7812:  
“Identification of Issuers—Part 1: Numbering System” further develops the business 
model by establishing a standard for the card identification number, which is 
displayed in embossed characters on the front face of an ID-1 card. The card 
identification number, which may be up to 19 characters long, is subdivided into three 
components:  
•  Issuer identification number—A six-digit component that includes the following:  
•  Major industry identifier—A one-digit indicator of the industry designation of the 
card issuer; it is one of the following:  
0—Tag reserved to indicate new industry assignments  
1—Airlines  
2—Airlines and other future industry assignments  
3—Travel and entertainment  
4—Banking/financial  
5—Banking/financial  
6—Merchandizing and banking  
7—Petroleum  
8—Telecommunications and other future industry assignments  
9—For assignment by national standards bodies  
•  Issuer identifier—A five-digit number associated with the specific issuing 
organization.  
•  Individual account identification number—A variable-length component up to 12 
digits maximum.  
•  Check digit—A cross-check number that is calculated from all the previous digits 
in the identification number according to an algorithm called the Luhn formula, 
which is defined in an appendix of ANSI/ISO/IEC 7812.  
The path toward standards-based specification of a general business mode (for 
financial transactions) becomes very explicit with ISO/IEC 7813: Identification 
Cards—Financial Transaction Cards. This specification does not consider any new 
technical areas, but makes a strict enumeration of the standards that must be adhered 
to in order to call a card a financial transaction card. 
ISO/IEC 7813 specifies the content of the two read-only tracks of a magnetic strip 
included on the card. This augments the content definition for ISO 4909 for the 




characteristics and the information content of cards suitable to support financial 








[1]  UML executable architectures of the CDRF architecture-Steve 
 Bernier 
[2]  Introduction to UML 
 http://www.omg.org/gettingstarted/what_is_uml.htm 
[3]  Functional Requirements and Use cases   
 www.bredemeyer.com/use_cases.htm 
[4]   Booch, G., I. Jacobson and J. Rumbaugh, The Unified Modeling 
 Language User Guide. Addison-Wesley, 1999, pp. 219-241. 
[5]  Christerson, Magnus, "From Use Cases to Components", Rose 
 Architect,  5/99. http://www.rosearchitect.com/cgi-bin/viewprint.pl 
[6]  Cockburn, Alistair, "Structuring Use Cases with Goals", Journal of 
 Object-  Oriented Programming, Sep-Oct, 1997 and Nov-Dec, 1997 
[7]  Cockburn, Alistair, "Basic Use Case Template", Oct .1998.  
[8]  Coleman, Derek, "A Use Case Template: Draft for discussion", 
 Fusion  Newsletter, April 1998. 
 http://www.hpl.hp.com/fusion/md_newsletters.html 
[9]   Constantine, Larry. "What Do Users Want? Engineering usability into  
 software" 
[10]   Malan, R. and D. Bredemeyer, "Functional Requirements and Use  
  Cases",  (functreq.pdf, 39k) June 1999. 
[10] UML Specification. http://www.rational.com/uml/index.jtmp 
[11] UML Class Diagrams – Bernhard Bauer 
[12] Understanding UML  
[13] www.wam.umd.edu/~rajshree/project 
[14] Identix LLC. www.identix.com 
[15] Cogent www.cogent.com 
[16] Biometric group www.biometricgroup.com 
[17] Wireless sensor network framework - Jose’ M. Perotti 
[18] Standards 
 http://www.biometricgroup.com/reports/rpt_standard s.html 
[19] Wireless Sensor Networks for Habitat Monitoring-Alan Mainwaring 
 Joseph Polastre Robert Szewczyk David Culler, John Anderson 
[20] Special Projects Office (SPO) Chemical and Biological Defense 
 Systems Robert Gibbs 
[21] Lecture notes Introduction to Sensors-Dr Marc Madou 
[22] Description of Industrial grade Chemical and Biological Sensors. 
[23] IEEE standard standards.ieee.org/wireless/overview.html 
[24] Sensor Fusion by Albert Tebo, OE Reports 164 - August 1997 
[25] Confusion Matrix www2.cs.uregina.ca/~hamilton/courses/831/notes/ 
[26] UML class diagrams revisited in the context of agent based systems-
 Bernhard Bauer 
[27] Sensor Deployment Strategy for Target Detection by Thomas 




[28] R. R. Brooks and S. S. Iyengar. Multi-Sensor Fusion Fundamentals 
 and Applications with Software. Prentice Hall, 1998. 
[29] P. Varshney. Distributed Detection and Data Fusion. Springer-Verlag 
 New-York, 1996. 
 
[30] T. Clouqueur, P. Ramanathan, K. K. Saluja, and K.-C. Wang. Value-
 fusion versus decision-fusion forfault-tolerance in collaborative target 
 detection in sensor networks. In Proceedings of Fourth 
 InternationalConference on Information Fusion, Aug. 2001. 
[31] Queueing models by Stephen. R. Lawrence 
 www.csupomona.edu/~hco/ManagementScience/ 
 09QueueingTheory.ppt 
[32] Power Management in Wireless Sensors – Zhiyuan Ren 
[33] Infrastructure tradeoffs for sensor networks – Sameer Tilak 
[34] Multiagent Systems – M .Vidal 
[35] An Environment Description Language – Antonio Chella 
[36] Extending UML to modeling and design of Multi-Agent Systems-
 Krishna Kavi 
[37] A generic agent architecture for multiagent systems – Paul Buhler 
[38] On Demand Power Management – Rong Zheng 
[39] Intelligent sensor Management – Mark Perillo, Wendi Heinzelman 
[40] Power Efficient Data Management – J.P. Lynch 
[41] Modeling agents with UML-J. Lara 
[42] Agent UML website- www.aUML.org 
[43] Distributed sensor fusion for object position estimation – Ashley 
 Stroupe, Martin, T. Balch 
[44] Sensor fusion using Kalman Filter – M. Spengler 
[45] Sensor fusion system – Bjoern Griesbach 
[46] Introduction to Space syntax - F.D.Neiman 
[47] Sensor Fusion – Laurence Saul 
 
 
 
